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We welcomed Alan Tomkins as coeditor of Court Review in the lastissue.  This issue marks my return to Court Review from the over-all leadership of the American Judges Association (see page 111
for the new president’s opening remarks).  I certainly enjoyed my year as AJA
president, but it will be great to be able to refocus on Court Review and its role
as an aid to judges both in doing their daily work and in protecting the role
of independent judges in our society.
For those of you who were unable to attend the AJA’s annual educa-
tional conference in Vancouver in September 2007, we will bring you some of
the highlights in this and coming issues.  In this issue, we present the remarks
of United States Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg on judicial inde-
pendence.  She was a delightful guest at our
conference, and we believe you will find her
remarks of interest.
This issue also includes Professor
Charles Whitebread’s annual review of recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
One of the highlights of each of AJA’s annual
educational conferences is Professor
Whitebread’s presentation of commentary
about these decisions.  In Vancouver, Justice
Ginsburg both attended Professor
Whitebread’s presentation and responded to
it.  Even without her insightful comments,
though, having an overview of the past year’s decisions of the Court will be of
interest to most judges.  We invite you to attend our 2008 annual educational
conference (September 7-12 in Maui, see page 151) for Professor Whitebread’s
update on the decisions of 2008.
This issue concludes with an article by Joseph Storch on the stan-
dards under which the United States is holding its own citizens as enemy
combatants.  Because those standards have not been explicitly detailed by the
government, Storch’s informed surmise about the standards being used raises
important questions and provides some initial conclusions.
In a future issue, we will follow up on another presentation made at
the Vancouver AJA conference—the AJA’s first “white paper,” which was pre-
sented and adopted by the AJA at the Vancouver conference.  That paper rec-
ommends a number of steps judges and courts can take to increase the per-
ception of procedural fairness in our courts.  We have a special issue in the
works on that topic; it will include—but go beyond—the paper presented in
Vancouver.  Before the special issue on procedural fairness, we’ll have a spe-
cial issue on the use of social-science concepts, including psychology, in the
courts.  Stay tuned. — Steve Leben
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
ing judges of the United States and Canada.  In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case man-
agement, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work.  Guidelines for the submission of manu-
scripts for Court Review are set forth on page 128.  Court
Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or reject mate-
rial submitted for publication.
Court Review is in full text on LEXIS and is indexed in the
Current Law Index, the Legal Resource Index, and
LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are wel-
come.  Please send such letters to one of Court Review’s
editors:  Judge Steve Leben, 301 S.W. 10th Ave., Suite
278, Topeka, Kansas 66612, email address:
sleben@ix.netcom.com; or Professor Alan Tomkins, 215
Centennial Mall South, Suite 401, PO Box 880228,
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-0228, email address: atom-
kins@nebraska.edu. Comments and suggestions for the
publication, not intended for publication, also are wel-
come.
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I can never say enough what an honor and a privilege it is to
have been elected to serve as your 46th president of the
American Judges Association.  I have used that time since our
annual conference in Vancouver to crystallize my vision of
what I would like to accomplish during my tenure and of what
I believe we can accomplish together. The potential to see
dreams realized is what keeps us going!  Like many of you, I
have concluded that judges in general—and the members of
AJA in particular—must seize the opportunity to improve our
delivery of services within the justice system and to address the
continuing concerns that we as judges have.  
When I joined AJA in 1995, I never envisioned leading this
most important and distinguished body of judges from all
states and provinces, from different levels and jurisdictions,
and from courts with varying subject matters.
What I now know for sure is that wherever we
sit, we have many commonalities that bind us. 
When I first became a member, none of the
following—cyber-crimes, security concerns, elec-
tion reform, multilingual litigants, caseflow man-
agement, court technology,  domestic-violence
protective orders—were at the forefront.  Drug
courts and a host of other specialty and problem-
solving courts were rare.  How things have
changed in just 12 short years! One of the most
significant benefits of AJA to me has been the exposure to the
best practices and educational programs on all of these subjects
as they were emerging. 
Thanks to the efforts of our immediate past president, Steve
Leben, we were successful in trademarking the phrase that for
years has defined AJA, the Voice of the Judiciary.® I am proud
to be at the helm when we will have a voice that is louder than
ever.  As the Voice of the Judiciary, AJA is poised to meet
unprecedented challenges.  We must be prepared to rise to the
occasion whenever topics of importance to the judiciary arise.   
I realize that I have taken office at a time when access to the
ideals of justice are often called into question.  Whether it is the
debate regarding the crack cocaine–powder disparities in sen-
tencing or the Jena 6 movement, or the overrepresentation of
minorities in the criminal-justice system, access-to-justice
issues abound.  I can assure you that I am personally invested
in involving our membership in a critical examination of such
topics.  Our education committee, led by Judge Elliott Zide of
Massachusetts and Judge Mary Celeste of Colorado, is mindful
of the need for continuing education in these areas.
Self-representation by litigants is at an all-time high, and this
complicates access issues even more.  The risk for inefficien-
cies, as well as many unintended consequences, are expensive
and time consuming for the court system.  It is the pro se liti-
gant who most often confuses procedural fairness with per-
ceived fairness.  I am also convinced that we can do more to
educate the public about our roles, authority, and limitations as
judges.  My “Tell It to the Judge” initiative is designed to open
the dialogue between stakeholders in the judicial system and
the public.  It is more than fitting since we live during a time in
history where there is raging debate over the role of judges in
our society.
Like you, I have seen a progressive influx of mentally ill per-
sons in our courtrooms.  In Virginia alone, 15% of jail and
prison inmates have a serious mental illness, and
43% percent of juveniles in detention are diag-
nosed with mental and emotional disorders.
Virginia’s experience is typical.  We judges must
examine responsible and necessary steps to deal
with this: the potential for criminalization of
mental illness is something we cannot afford to
ignore.  For this reason, I have appointed an ad
hoc committee to address these concerns.  Judges
Belinda Hill of Texas and Judge Lynda Howell of
Arizona will co-chair this committee.
For all of us, ensuring access and fairness and strengthening
and preserving the independence of the judiciary must remain
priorities.  We as AJA members are bound together, not just by
our friendships, but also by a mutual dedication to these con-
cepts. 
The beginning of a new year is a time for all of us to reflect
on our successes and disappointments of the past and to focus
on our hopes for the future.  It is the same with the AJA.  2007
brought with it many successful firsts including the first AJA
white paper, thanks to Judge Kevin Burke of Minnesota and
Judge Steve Leben of Kansas.  I am hopeful in this organiza-
tional year that we will see many firsts as well, including the
“Tell It to the Judge” programs and the committee on issues of
mental health in criminal justice. 
Equal access to all who come before us, and independence
to carry out our duties in our courtrooms, faithfully and impar-
tially, are pillars of our judiciary.  I greet 2008 with optimism as
we continue to serve the nation’s judges and the public by ele-
vating all that is good about our profession!
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President’s Column
Eileen Olds
Editor’s Note:  These remarks were delivered by Justice Ginsburg
on September 27, 2007, at the annual educational conference of
the American Judges Association.  Because the conference took
place in Vancouver and was a joint conference with two Canadian
judicial organizations, she included some references to Canadian
sources.
Footnotes
1. William H. Rehnquist, Dedicatory Address: Act Well Your Part:
Therein All Honor Lies, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1980).
2. The Constitution guarantees that federal judges “shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior . . . and shall . . . receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.”  U.S. CONST. art III, § 1, cl. 2.
Proposals have been made to place term limits on U.S. Supreme
Court service.  See, e.g., R. CRAMTON & P. CARRINGTON, THE
SUPREME COURT RENEWAL ACT: A RETURN TO BASIC PRINCIPLES, IN
REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
467–471 (R. Cramton & P. Carrington eds. 2006) (proposing 18-
year limits on active service); Calabresi & Lindgren, Term Limits
for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 769 (2006).  But so far, discussion of such measures has
remained largely academic.  See, e.g., L. Greenhouse, New Focus
on the Effects of Life Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, p. A20
(stating that the legislation proposed by Profs. Cramton and
Carrington “has not found a sponsor”).
3. See Constitution Act of 1867, §§ 99–100.
4. See Judiciary Reorganization Act, S. 1392, 75th Cong. § 1(a)
(1937), reprinted in Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary, S.
Rep. No. 75-711, p. 31 (1937).
Essential to the rule of law in any land is an independentjudiciary, judges not under the thumb of other branchesof Government, and therefore equipped to administer the
law impartially.  As experience in the United States and else-
where confirms, however, judicial independence is vulnerable
to assault; it can be shattered if the society law exists to serve
does not take care to assure its preservation.
On the essence of independent, impartial judging, a com-
ment by former U.S. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist seems
to me right on target.  Using a metaphor from his favorite
sport, he compared the role of a judge “to that of a referee in a
basketball game who is obliged to call a foul against a member
of the home team at a critical moment in the game: he will be
soundly booed, but he is nonetheless obliged to call it as he
saw it, not as the home crowd wants him to call it.”1
My remarks concentrate on judicial independence in the
system I know best, the Third Branch of the U.S. Govern-
ment—the federal courts—and on efforts by the political
branches to curtail that independence.  
I.
Under the U.S. Constitution, federal judges hold their
offices essentially for life, with no compulsory retirement age,
and their salaries may not be diminished by the legislature.2
(Canadian judges enjoy similar “security of tenure,” although
retirement at age 75 is mandatory.3)  Through life tenure and
compensation that cannot be reduced, the founders of the
United States sought to advance the Judiciary’s independence
from Congress and the President, and thus to safeguard the
judges’ ability to decide cases impartially.  Yet I doubt that
constitutional insulation would have protected the federal
bench if we did not have a culture that frowns on attempts to
make the courts over to fit the President’s or the Congress’
image.  
A well-known illustration of that culture.  Some 70 years
ago, a proposal to pack the U.S. Supreme Court was
announced by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  The
Supreme Court of that day had resisted President Roosevelt’s
New Deal program.  In a 13-month span, the Court held
unconstitutional 16 pieces of federal social and economic
legislation.  
Frustrated by his inability to replace the “nine old men”
then seated on the Court, President Roosevelt sent to the
Senate a bill to overcome the Court’s recalcitrance.  He pro-
posed adding one justice for each member of the Court who
had served ten years, and did not retire in the six months fol-
lowing his seventieth birthday.4 FDR’s proposal would have
immediately swelled the Court’s size from nine to 15 members.
(If the 1937 plan were to be applied to the current Court, we
would today have a 13-member bench.)  Two developments,
manifest by the end of 1937, contributed to the defeat of
Roosevelt’s plan:  public opposition to the President’s endeavor
to capture the Court; and a growing understanding among the
justices that it was appropriate to defer to legislative judgments
on matters of social and economic policy.  FDR’s idea has never
been renewed.  Those who care about the health and welfare of
our system appreciate that packing the Court to suit the mood
of the political branches (Congress and the President) would
severely erode the status of the Judiciary as a coequal branch
of government.
II.
I turn now to some recent threats to the security of U.S.
judges who decide cases without regard to what the “home
crowd” wants.
A headline-producing case in point.  Early in 2005, federal
courts sitting in Florida confronted a cause célèbre.  On order
of the Florida state courts, a hospital had removed the feeding
tube from Terri Schiavo, a severely brain-damaged woman
whose situation sparked a huge controversy over the right to
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2005, at A07.
11. Quoted in David D. Kirkpatrick, Republican Suggests a Judicial
Inspector General, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2005, at A12. 
12. Quoted in id. 
13. Quoted in Maurice Possley, Lawmaker Prods Court, Raises Brows;
Demands Longer Term in Chicago Drug Case, CHI. TRIB., July 10,
2005, at C1.
14. See S. Res. 92, 109th Cong. (2005); H. Res. 97, 109th Cong.
(2005); Constitution Restoration Act, S. 520, H.R. 1070, § 201,
109th Cong. (2005); American Justice for Americans Citizen Act,
H.R. 1658, § 3 (2005).
15. Toward “Active Liberty,” HARV. L. BULL. 14, 18 (Spring 2006).
5. See Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo §5,
Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15, 16 (Mar. 21, 2005) (“Nothing in
this Act shall be construed to create substantive rights . . . .”).
6. Quoted in Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Even Death Does Not
Quiet Harsh Political Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at A1.   
7. Quoted in id.
8. Quoted in Editorial, Attacking a Free Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
2005, at A22.  
9. Editorial, Judges Made Them Do It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at
A22.
10. Quoted in Charles Babington, Senator Links Violence to ‘Political’
Decisions; ‘Unaccountable’ Judiciary Raises Ire, WASH. POST, Apr. 5,
refuse life support.  Congress entered the fray by passing a
most unusual statute giving the federal courts jurisdiction to
hear the plea of Terry Schiavo’s parents, but not altering the
governing substantive law.5 The federal courts read the
statute as it was written, and refused to override the Florida
courts by ordering restoration of the feeding tube.  This was
not the outcome wanted by a goodly number of the members
of Congress.  In angry reaction, the then House Majority
Leader accused federal judges of “thumb[ing] their nose[s] at
Congress and the [P]resident.”6 He warned: “[T]he time will
come for the men responsible for this to answer for their
behavior.”7 “Congress,” he amplified, “for many years has
shirked its responsibility to hold the judiciary accountable.
No longer.”8
Similarly unsettling, in the same year, 2005, two episodes of
violence against judges shocked the nation.  A state court judge
was murdered while on the bench in Atlanta and a federal
judge’s mother and husband were murdered at the judge’s home
in Chicago.9 Shortly thereafter, a prominent Senator gave a
widely reported speech on the Senate floor.  After inveighing
against “activist jurists,” he suggested there may be “a cause-
and-effect connection” between judicial activism and the “recent
episodes of courthouse violence in this country.”10
The blasts from Congress were not merely verbal.  In May
2005, the House Judiciary Committee considered creating an
“office of inspector general for the federal judiciary.”11 The
office would investigate allegations of judicial misconduct and
report them to Congress.  The Committee’s chairman said, in
announcing the proposal, that judges must “be punished in
some capacity for behavior that does not rise to the level of
impeachable conduct.”12 If the then chairman’s subsequent
action indicated the role he envisioned for the proposed
inspector general, judges had good cause for concern.  In June
2005, that chairman’s office dispatched a letter to a U.S. Court
of Appeals, complaining that the court had affirmed an unlaw-
fully low sentence for a narcotics-case defendant.  The letter
called for a “prompt response . . . to rectify” the decision,13
even though the government sought no further review of the
sentence.
Another troubling congressional initiative:  proposals to
prohibit federal courts from relying on foreign law.14 A mis-
understanding appears to underlie the opposition to foreign
law citations.  As Justice Stephen Breyer explained in a recent
interview, citations to foreign laws and decisions should not be
controversial.15 “References to cases elsewhere are never bind-
Court Review 113
ing,” Justice Breyer emphasized.  We interpret and apply only
our own Constitution, our own laws.  But it can add to our
store of knowledge “to look at how other people [with a com-
mitment to democracy similar to our own] solve similar prob-
lems.”  (In this regard, I have found enlightening decisions of
Canada’s Supreme Court.)  Justice Breyer compared references
to the decisions of foreign and international tribunals to refer-
ences to a treatise or to a professor’s work.  
Lest I appear to be spreading too much gloom, I should
emphasize the vocal defenders of the Judiciary, intelligent
voices that do not divide along party lines.  The New York
Times, a paper some regard as “liberal,” recently editorialized:
“The courts will not always be popular; they will not always be
right.  But if Congress succeeds in curtailing the judiciary’s
16. Editorial, supra, note 8.
17. Theodore B. Olson, Lay Off Our Judiciary, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21,
2005, at A16.
18. Federal Judicial Center, Impeachments of Federal Judges,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/topics_ji_bdy (last vis-
ited Aug. 28, 2007).
19. Maria Simon, Note, Bribery and Other Not So “Good Behavior”:
Criminal Prosecution as a Supplement to Impeachment of Federal
Judges, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1617, 1617 n.2 (1994).
20. Streamlined Procedures Act, U.S. 1088, H.R. 3035, 109th Cong.
(2005).
21. Safeguarding our Religious Liberties Act, H.R. 4576, § 2, 109th
Cong. (2005). 
22. We the People Act, H.R. 4379, § 3, 109th Cong. (2005). 
23. Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of 2005,
H.R. 3073, § 2, 109th Cong. (2005). 
24. Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 33(1).
ability to act as a check on the other two branches, the nation
will be far less free.”16 Former Solicitor General Ted Olson,
generally perceived as conservative, published a similar view:
“Americans understand,” and I hope he is right, “that no sys-
tem is perfect and no judge immune from error, but also that
our society would crumble if we did not respect the judicial
process and the judges who make it work.”17
History suggests that Congress is unlikely to employ the
nuclear weapon—impeachment—against judges who decide
cases in a way the “home crowd” does not want.  In the 219
years since the ratification of the Constitution, the House of
Representatives has impeached only 13 federal judges; in only
seven instances did impeachment result in a Senate convic-
tion,18 and those judges were removed not for wrongly inter-
preting the law, but for unquestionably illegal behavior, such as
extortion, perjury, and waging war against the United States.19
Although politically driven impeachment of federal judges
is a remote prospect, yet another threat to judicial indepen-
dence cannot be discounted so easily.  In President Clinton’s
second term, it bears reminding, political hazing of federal
judicial nominees was unrelenting.  The confirmation process
in those years often strayed from examining the qualifications
of each nominee into an endeavor to uncover some hidden
“liberal” agenda the nominee supposedly harbored.  For many
Democrats, President Bush’s successive terms have been pay-
back time, an opportunity to hold up or reject Bush nominees
to the federal judiciary on ideological grounds.
Injecting politics prominently into the nomination or the
confirmation process means long delays in filling judicial
vacancies, and delay, in the face of mounting caseloads, threat-
ens to erode the quality of justice the U.S. federal judiciary
can provide.  Vacancies in large numbers inevitably sap the
energy and depress the spirits of the judges left to handle
heavy dockets.
I should mention, too, the host of jurisdiction-curtailing
measures lately placed in the congressional hopper.  One bill
would have severely limited the scope of federal habeas corpus
review.20 Another would have removed federal courts’ author-
ity to decide any case concerning the Ten Commandments, the
Pledge of Allegiance, and the National Motto, “In God We
Trust.”21 Yet another would have taken away from the federal
courts authority to adjudicate free exercise or establishment of
religion claims, privacy claims (including those raising “any
issue of sexual practices, orientation, or reproduction”), and
any claim to equal protection of the laws “based upon the right
to marry without regard to sex or sexual orientation.”22
All these proposals, and other like-minded bills, failed, as
students of history could have predicted.  Jurisdiction-strip-
ping reactions to disliked decisions have been proposed peren-
nially.  In the 1950s, desegregation and domestic-security cases
were on some legislators’ strip lists; in the 1960s, federal court
review of certain criminal justice matters; in the 1970s, busing
to achieve racial integration in schools; in the 1980s, abortion
and school prayer.  None of these efforts succeeded, and most
of the more recent endeavors to curb federal court jurisdiction
have fared no better.  A simple truth has helped to spare the
Federal Judiciary from onslaughts of this character: It is easier
to block a bill than to get it enacted.    
I note, finally, a Congress-Court confrontation proposed in
2004 and revived the next year.  The most recent try, titled the
“Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of
2005,” would allow U.S. Supreme Court judgments declaring
a federal law unconstitutional to be overturned by a two-thirds
vote of the House and Senate.23 (Canada’s Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, if I recall the “notwithstanding clause” cor-
rectly,24 allows for a legislative override of a Supreme Court
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decision holding a statute incompatible with a Charter-pro-
tected right.  But the Parliament, is it not so, has yet to avail
itself of that prerogative.)
A Constitution providing for legislative override of court
decisions resolving constitutional questions, author and jour-
nalist Anthony Lewis observed, “would be more democratic in
the sense that it would remove constraints on majority rule.”25
But, Lewis rightly reminds us, in the words of Aharon Barak,
former president of the Supreme Court of Israel:  “‘Democracy
is not only majority rule.  Democracy is also the rule of basic
values . . . values upon which the whole democratic structure
is built, and which even the majority cannot touch.’”26 The
founders of the United States did not envision a rule of law
based on pure majoritarianism,27 and I see no cause to open
the door to a legislative override now.
Particularly since the 2006 election, I am pleased to relate,
rapport between Congress and the federal courts has markedly
improved.  No bills of the kind I have described have been
introduced in the current Congress, and one sees far fewer
broadsides against “activist judges” reported in the press.
A note on U.S. state courts, whose judges in most states, at
least at some levels, are chosen in periodic elections.  A ques-
tion I am often asked when traveling abroad: “Isn’t an elected
judiciary totally at odds with judicial independence?”  How
can an elected judge resist doing “what the home crowd
wants”?  I have no fully satisfactory answers to those ques-
tions. 
To return to my starting line, when former Chief Justice
Rehnquist described an independent judiciary as the USA’s
hallmark and pride, he was repeating a theme sounded since
the United States became a nation.  James Madison was per-
haps most eloquent on the subject.  When he introduced in
Congress the amendments that became the Bill of Rights, he
said:
[I]ndependent tribunals of justice will consider
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of th[e]se
rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of power in the Legislative or
Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the
Constitution by the declaration of rights.28
Madison may have put the matter with more force than his-
tory confirms, but his basic idea remains vibrant.  
It is fitting, I think, to close with the words of two U.S. legal
scholars from different ends of the political spectrum—one,
Bruce Fein, known for his “conservative perspective,” the
other, Burt Neuborne, known for his “progressive vision.”
Though often on opposite sides in debate, they joined together
to speak with one voice on the value of judicial independence.
Their co-authored essay concludes: 
Judicial independence in the United States strength-
ens ordered liberty, domestic tranquility, the rule of law,
and democratic ideals. . . .  It would be folly to squan-
der this priceless constitutional gift to placate the clam-
ors of benighted political partisans.29
To that, I would add only “Amen.”
Ruth Bader Ginsburg has been an Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court since 1993; she was appointed to the Court
by President Bill Clinton.  She had previously served as a judge on
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
from 1980 to 1993, and she was a law professor at Rutgers
University School of Law (1963–1972) and at the Columbia Law
School (1972–1980).  In 1971, she was instrumental in launching
the Women’s Rights Project of the American Civil Liberties Union;
she served as the ACLU’s general counsel from 1973 to 1980.  She
received her B.A. from Cornell University, attended Harvard Law
School, and received her LL.B. from Columbia Law School.  
25. Anthony Lewis, Why the Courts, RECORD, Mar./Apr. 2000, at 178,
181.
26. Id. (quoting Aharon Barak, president of the Supreme Court of
Israel).
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
28. James Madison, Address to the House of Representatives (June 8,
1789), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 224 (Marvin Meyers
ed., 1973).
29. Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, Why Should We Care About
Independent and Accountable Judges?, 84 JUDICATURE 58, 64 (2000).
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The past Term of the Court was one in which it swung tothe right.  A single justice, Justice Anthony Kennedy,made all the difference—being in the majority in every
five-to-four decision that split along ideological lines.
Significant 5-4 civil decisions included ones upholding the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, limiting Title VII pay-
discrimination suits by strictly interpreting the date the statute
of limitations begins to run, limiting the ability of school dis-
tricts to consider race in assigning students to schools, and fur-
ther limiting punitive-damage claims.
FIRST AMENDMENT
In Davenport v. Washington Education Association,1 the Court
upheld a state law limiting the use of non-union member fees.
Washington State law permits unions and government employ-
ers to engage in agency-shop agreements, which allow unions
to charge dues to non-union members to “prevent nonmem-
bers from free-riding on the union’s efforts.”  However,
Washington law requires authorization by a nonmember
before using his fees “to make contributions or expenditures to
influence an election or to operate a political committee.”  The
respondent is “the exclusive bargaining agent for approxi-
mately 70,000 public educational employees,” and in this
capacity, it “collected agency fees from nonmembers that it
represented in collective bargaining.”  The State of Washington
brought suit against the respondent, as did several nonmem-
bers who paid agency shop fees, claiming its “use of agency
fees was in violation of § 760” and that the “respondent had
failed to obtain affirmative authorization from nonmembers
before using their agency fees for the election-related purposes
specified in § 760.” The Supreme Court of Washington held
that section 760 violated the First Amendment “by imposing
on respondent the burden of confirming that a nonmember
does not object to the expenditure of his agency fees for elec-
toral purpose” and by “interfer[ing] with respondent’s expres-
sive associational rights….”  The Court begins by examining
the Supreme Court of Washington’s reasoning and noting that
it reached its holding mostly based on a passage from Teachers
v. Hudson,2 which states: “‘[D]issent is not to be presumed—it
must affirmatively be made known to the union by the dis-
senting employee.’”  The Court rejects this line of reasoning
because it improperly extends this precedent in assuming “that
unions have … constitutional entitlement to the fees of non-
member-employees.”  Additionally, the Court acknowledges
that “content-based regulations of speech are presumptively
invalid,” but it finds that precedent also establishes “that the
government can make content-based distinctions when it sub-
sidizes speech.”  The Court finds this latter principle applica-
ble to the case at hand because section 760 was concerned with
the integrity of the electoral process and was “limited to the
state-created harm that the voters sought to remedy.”
In Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association v.
Brentwood Academy,3 the Court held that a state-sponsored
high-school athletic league’s rule prohibiting “undue influ-
ence” in recruiting middle-school athletes does not violate the
First Amendment.  The petitioner, Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Association (TSSAA), regulates sports among
numerous private and public high schools in Tennessee,
including the respondent: Brentwood Academy. TSSAA pro-
hibits these schools “from using ‘undue influence’ in recruiting
middle school students for their athletic programs.”
Brentwood Academy’s football coach violated this prohibition,
and the TSSAA placed sanctions upon Brentwood.  Afterwards,
Brentwood brought this action against TSSAA, alleging that the
prohibition violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and that TSSAA “deprived the school of due process of law”
because of its handling of its appeal.  The Court first notes that
“Brentwood’s speech rights are not absolute” and that “[t]he
anti-recruiting rule strikes nowhere near the heart of the First
Amendment” because it regulates “direct, personalized com-
munication in a coercive setting” as opposed to “prohibiting
appeals to the public at large,” a distinction illustrated in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn.4 In Ohralik, the Court held that
a state bar association’s decision to discipline a lawyer “for the
in-person solicitation of clients” does not violate the First
Amendment because the “ban was more akin to a conduct reg-
ulation than a speech restriction.”  In examining Ohralik, the
Court concludes that its “‘narrow’ holding is limited to con-
duct that is ‘“inherently conducive to overreaching and other
forms of misconduct.”’”  The Court believes that this “danger
of undue influence … [is] also present when a high school
coach contacts an eighth grader” because of the “youthful
hopes and fear” involved in the decision whether to play high-
school sports at a particular school.  Against this background,
the Court holds that “TSSAA’s limited regulation of recruiting
conduct poses no significant First Amendment concerns.”
In a narrow decision, the Court held in Morse v. Frederick5
that a high-school principal did not violate the respondent’s
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First Amendment rights by requiring him to take down a
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner.  The petitioner, Deborah
Morse, a high-school principal in Alaska, gave permission to
her students, including respondent Joseph Frederick, to miss
classes to view the passing of the Olympic Torch Relay.  As the
torch and camera crews passed, Frederick and several of his
friends displayed a 14-foot banner reading: “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS.” Thinking the banner “encouraged illegal drug use, in
violation of school policy,” Principal Morse told the students to
take it down, and “[e]veryone but Frederick complied.”  After
confiscating the banner, she suspended Frederick.  Frederick
argues “that this is not a school speech case.”  The Court
begins by rejecting this argument because the event in ques-
tion occurred during regular school hours and “was sanctioned
by Principal Morse ‘as an approved social event or class trip.’”
The Court next examines the banner, finding its message to be
“cryptic,” but agreeing with Morse that it could reasonably be
interpreted as advocating the use of illegal drugs.  The Court
rejects Frederick’s argument that he was just trying to get on
television because it might explain his motive, but not the con-
tent of the sign.  In light of its findings, the Court frames the
relevant issue as “whether a principal may … restrict student
speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably
viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”  The Court finds that its
precedent recognizes “that deterring drug use by schoolchild-
ren is an ‘important—indeed, perhaps compelling’ interest.”
The Court holds that in light of “‘the special characteristics of
the school environment’” and the drug-use problem in schools,
school officials may “restrict student expression that they rea-
sonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”  The Court
states that Morse acted reasonably in believing that the banner
promoted the use of illegal drugs and feels “that failing to act
would send a powerful message to the students … about how
serious the school was about the dangers of illegal drug use.”
Given its holding, the Court does not reach the issue of quali-
fied immunity.
In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc.,6 a 5-4 Court held that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002 (BCRA) is unconstitutional as applied to respon-
dent’s issue-focused advertisements because the FEC cannot
demonstrate that the statute’s ban on these ads is narrowly tai-
lored to further a compelling interest. The BCRA makes it a
crime for a corporation to use company funds for any “‘elec-
tioneering communication,’” which includes “any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication that refers to a candidate for
federal office and that is aired within 30 days of a federal pri-
mary election or 60 days of a federal general election in the
jurisdiction in which that candidate is running for office.”  In
2004, the respondent, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL),
planned to air three television and radio commercials arguing
against a Senate filibuster and encouraging viewers to
“‘[c]ontact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose
the filibuster.’”  WRTL realized that its planned airing would
violate BCRA section 203 and filed suit against the Federal
Election Commission
(FEC) seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief.  The
Court first addresses the
FEC’s argument that “these
cases are moot because the
2004 election has passed
….”  The Court disagrees
because the WRTL reason-
ably expects to run “‘mate-
rially similar’” ads in the
future, and “there is no rea-
son to believe that the FEC will ‘refrain from prosecuting vio-
lations.’”  The Court next turns to the First Amendment issues
presented, stating that “[b]ecause § 203 burdens political
speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny” and “the Government
must prove that applying BCRA to WRTL’s ads furthers a com-
pelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that inter-
est.”  Because McConnell v. Federal Election Com’n7 already
upheld BCRA “to the extent it regulates express advocacy or its
functional equivalent,” the Court states that if the ads in this
case fall into these categories, the FEC has proven its case.
However, if they do not, the FEC must meet the more difficult
standard above.  To help this determination, the Court adopts
an objective test, holding that “a court should find an ad is the
functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is sus-
ceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal
to vote for or against a specific candidate.”  The Court con-
cludes that WRTL’s ads “are plainly not the functional equiva-
lent of express advocacy” because they “focus on a legislative
issue, take a position on that issue, … and … do not mention
an election, candidacy, political party, or challenger ….”  The
Court next applies the “narrowly tailored to further a com-
pelling interest” standard.  Citing Buckley v. Valeo,8 the Court
notes its long recognition of “‘the governmental interest in pre-
venting corruption and the appearance of corruption’ in elec-
tion campaigns.”  However, the Court sees no reason for
extending speech limitations outside the context of campaign
speech and concludes that the regulation of corporate cam-
paign speech “has no application to issue advocacy of the sort
engaged in by WRTL.”
In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,9 a split
Court held that respondents, as taxpayers, lack standing under
Article III to challenge the executive branch’s organization of
conferences allegedly promoting religion.  In 2001, President
Bush formed the White House Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives to “ensure that ‘private and charitable
community groups, including religious ones … have the fullest
opportunity permitted by law to compete on a level playing
field….’”  Congress did not enact legislation promoting the
Office or any of the related centers, and the money for them
comes solely from “general Executive Branch appropriations.”
The respondents, Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,
and three of its members, filed suit in federal court, arguing
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that the petitioners violated
the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution by orga-
nizing conferences that
were allegedly “designed to
promote, and had the effect
of promoting, religious
groups over secular ones.”
Justice Alito announced the
judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion, in
which Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Kennedy joined.
He begins by noting that
under Establishment Clause
precedent, parties cannot challenge laws of general application
unless they have been personally injured, and generally “the
interest of a federal taxpayer in seeing that Treasury funds are
spent in accordance with the Constitution does not give rise to
the kind of redressable ‘personal injury’ required for Article III
standing.”  He notes that Flast v. Cohen10 created a “narrow
exception” to this principle but requires a taxpayer to estab-
lish: (1) a “‘logical link between the status and the type of leg-
islative enactment attacked;’” and (2) “‘a nexus between the
status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement
alleged.’”  The respondents argue that Flast should govern the
present case.  Justice Alito finds the requisite link does not
exist in the present case because the respondents do not chal-
lenge any specific congressional appropriation and the expen-
ditures at issue “resulted from executive discretion, not con-
gressional action.”  Justice Alito also rejects the respondents’
position because he feels that without a distinction between
executive and congressional spending, almost “every federal
action” would be subject to an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge.  Justice Alito further notes that the respondents have
failed to supply a “workable limitation” on such challenges if
Flast were extended to govern their case.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In Philip Morris USA v. Williams,11 a 5-4 Court, in an opin-
ion written by Justice Breyer, held that the Constitution
requires some procedural method for ensuring that juries do
not use punitive damages to punish a defendant for harm
caused to nonparties.  The respondent, the widow of Jesse
Williams, filed a lawsuit against Philip Morris for negligence
and deceit.  A jury found that Williams’s death resulted from
smoking Marlboro cigarettes and that Philip Morris led him to
believe smoking was safe.  The jury awarded respondent
$821,000 on the deceit claim and $79.5 million in punitive
damages.  On review, Philip Morris argued that the trial court
erred in rejecting a jury instruction regarding punitive dam-
ages “that specified the jury could not seek to punish Philip
Morris for injury to other persons not before the court.”  Philip
Morris also argued that the approximately 100-to-1 ratio
between the punitive damages and compensatory damages was
unreasonable under BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore.12 The
Court granted certiorari on two questions: (1) whether
“Oregon had unconstitutionally permitted [Philip Morris] to
be punished for harming nonparty victims;” and (2) “whether
Oregon had in effect disregarded ‘the constitutional require-
ment that punitive damages be reasonably related to the plain-
tiff’s harm.’”   The Court focuses its analysis on the Due
Process Clause, finding that it “forbids a State to use a punitive
damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts
upon nonparties or those whom they directly represent.”
Therefore, states must “provide assurance that juries are not …
seeking … to punish for harm caused strangers.” The respon-
dent argues that the Oregon Supreme Court understood this
and did not allow punitive damages against nonparties.  The
Court agrees that some sections of the Oregon Supreme Court’s
opinion focus “only upon reprehensibility” but concludes that
that court erred in affirming the Oregon Court of Appeals’
decision because it did not allow any form of protection
against the jury awarding punitive damages for injuries to non-
parties.
CIVIL RIGHTS
In Wallace v. Kato,13 a 7-2 Court held that a cause of action
for a claim of false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. section 1983
begins at the time the prisoner is subjected to legal process.
The petitioner Andrew Wallace was picked up by police offi-
cers in Chicago on January 19, 1994, two days after John
Handy was shot to death.  He was taken to the police station
around 8 p.m. and interrogated until the early morning of the
following day, when he agreed to confess to Handy’s murder.
The petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder at trial and
sentenced to 26 years in prison.  The Appellate Court of
Illinois reversed the conviction because officers had no proba-
ble cause when arresting petitioner, a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.  The prosecutors subsequently dropped all
charges against petitioner on April 10, 2002.  On April 2, 2003,
the petitioner filed suit against the city of Chicago and several
police officers under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for damages aris-
ing from his unlawful arrest.  The District Court granted
respondents’ motion for summary judgment, and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, finding the suit barred under the applicable
statute of limitations because the petitioner’s “cause of action
accrued at the time of his arrest, not when his conviction was
later set aside.”  The Court begins by noting that both sides
agree that the correct statute of limitations is two years, but
they contest when the petitioner’s cause of action began.  The
Court finds that the tort of false imprisonment is analogous to
the petitioner’s claim because “the sort of unlawful detention
remediable by the tort of false imprisonment is detention with-
out legal process.”  Because the statute of limitations on false
imprisonment claims begins to run “‘when the alleged false
imprisonment ends,’” the Court must decide when the peti-
tioner’s false imprisonment ended.  The Court holds that false
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imprisonment ends “once
the victim becomes held
pursuant” to legal process
and that any claim after this
point would be for mali-
cious prosecution.  There-
fore, the Court concludes
that the petitioner’s cause of
action began “when he
appeared before the exam-
ining magistrate and was
bound over for trial,” and
the two-year limitations period has run.
In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.,14 a 5-4
Court held that petitioner’s sex-discrimination claims based on
pay decisions made prior to the 180-day period required by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act were time barred.  The peti-
tioner Lilly Ledbetter was employed by the respondent
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, and she filed a question-
naire and a formal charge of sex discrimination in 1998 with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Later the same year, after retiring, the petitioner began this
action, asserting “a Title VII pay discrimination claim and a
claim under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA).”  A jury awarded
her backpay and damages.  On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit,
Goodyear claimed that the petitioner’s claim “was time barred
with respect to all pay decisions made prior to … 180 days
before the filing of her EEOC questionnaire” and that “no dis-
criminatory act relating to Ledbetter’s pay occurred after that
date.”  The Eleventh Circuit agreed and reversed the lower
court’s decision.  The Court begins by examining Title VII,
which requires an employee seeking to challenge an allegedly
discriminatory practice to “file a charge with the EEOC …
within a specified period (either 180 or 300 days, depending
on the State) ‘after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred.’”  The petitioner argues that each paycheck she
received “was a separate act of discrimination,” and, alterna-
tively, that a 1998 evaluation with no raise was “‘unlawful
because it carried forward intentionally discriminatory dispar-
ities from prior years.’”  The Court rejects both these argu-
ments because the petitioner does not allege that Goodyear
had discriminatory intent during either of these acts, but only
“prior to the EEOC charging period.” The Court notes that
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans15 held that “the continuing effects
of the precharging period discrimination did not make out a
present violation.”  The Court also cites Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc.,16 which held “that the … charging period
ran from the time when the discrete act … occurred, not from
the date when the effects of this practice were felt.”  Based on
these decisions, the Court finds that “[a] new violation does
not occur … upon the occurrence of subsequent nondiscrimi-
natory acts that entail adverse effects resulting from past dis-
crimination.”  The Court concludes that the petitioner’s claim
of continuing effects of past discrimination is inconsistent with
these decisions.
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No 1.,17 a 5-4 Court held that two school-district stu-
dent-distribution plans are unconstitutional to the extent that
they rely solely upon race as a determinative factor.  In 1998,
the respondent Seattle School District No. 1 implemented a
new student-distribution plan.  If a school is “not within 10
percentage points of the district’s” 41% white and 59% “non-
white” balance, the district will select for “students whose race
‘will serve to bring the school into balance.’”  The petitioner,
Parents Involved in Community Schools, sued in District
Court, alleging that the system violated the Equal Protection
Clause.  In 2001, the respondent Jefferson County adopted a
program under which all nonmagnet schools must maintain a
minimum 15% and a maximum 50% black enrollment.  The
petitioner Crystal Meredith applied to transfer her son to a
school only one mile from her home but was denied because it
“‘would have an adverse effect on desegregation compliance.’”
The petitioner brought suit, alleging violations of the Equal
Protection Clause.  The Court first notes that racial classifica-
tion plans must be “‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘com-
pelling’ government interest.’”  The Court has recognized two
compelling interests in the context of racial classifications: (1)
“remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination”; and
(2) promoting “diversity in higher education.”  The Court
finds that the first applies in neither case.  The second com-
pelling interest was outlined in Grutter v. Bollinger,18 which
reiterated that “‘it is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity,
in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect
guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, that can
justify the use of race.’” Grutter upheld a law-school admis-
sions process that took race into account to achieve diversity.
In contrast to the system in Grutter, the Court finds that in
those at issue here, race “is not simply one factor weighed with
others in reaching a decision …; it is the factor.”  The Court
also feels that unlike the system in Grutter, those in the instant
cases “employ only a limited notion of diversity, viewing race
exclusively in white/nonwhite terms in Seattle and
black/‘other’ terms in Jefferson County.”  The respondents offer
two other possible compelling interests: (1) race classifications
“[help] to reduce racial concentration in schools and to ensure
that racially concentrated housing patterns do not prevent
nonwhite students from having access to the most desirable
schools”; and (2) schools have an interest in “educating … stu-
dents ‘in a racially integrated environment’” because “educa-
tion and broader socialization benefits flow from a racially
diverse learning environment.”  The Court rejects these inter-
ests because they are “not narrowly tailored to the goal of
achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow
from racial diversity” and because this type of “‘outright racial
balancing’” would “‘assur[e] that race will always be relevant
in American life, and that the “ultimate goal” of “eliminating
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entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant
factors as a human being’s race” will never be achieved.’”  The
Court also finds that the “minimal impact [of the programs] …
casts doubt upon the necessity of using racial classifications.”
Lastly, the Court rejects the arguments in Justice Breyer’s
lengthy dissent as a misunderstanding and misapplication of
its precedent.   The Court concludes that “[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discrimination on
the basis of race.”
FEDERALISM
In United Haulers Association, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Management Authority,19 a divided Court held that flow-
control ordinances benefiting a public enterprise do not vio-
late the dormant Commerce Clause because they do not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce.  The two respondent
counties involved in this case have traditionally disposed of
their own waste, but “[b]y the 1980’s, the Counties con-
fronted … a solid waste ‘crisis.’”  In response, they requested
the creation of respondent Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority (Authority), and New York’s legisla-
ture obliged.  Under an agreement between the counties and
the Authority, “private haulers would remain free to pick up
citizens’ trash…, but the Authority would take over the job of
processing the trash, sorting it, and sending it off for dis-
posal.”  The counties used “flow control ordinances” mandat-
ing that “all solid waste generated within the Counties be
delivered to the Authority’s processing sites.”  To cover its
expenses, the Authority collected “tipping fees” that “signifi-
cantly exceeded those charged for waste removal on the open
market.”  The petitioners represent six private waste haulers
that operated in the counties.  In 1995, they sued the respon-
dents, “alleging that the flow control laws violate the
Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate com-
merce.”  The petitioners submitted evidence that the market
price for disposing of waste was between $37 and $55 per ton,
while the Authority’s tipping fee was $86 per ton.  The Court
begins by laying out the dormant Commerce Clause test,
which requires the Court to “first ask whether [a law] dis-
criminates on its face against interstate commerce.”  Those
discriminatory laws that are “motivated by ‘simple economic
protectionism’ are subject to a ‘virtually per se rule of invalid-
ity’ … which can only be overcome by a showing that the State
has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose.”  In
analyzing the ordinances, the Court states that “it does not
make any sense to regard laws favoring local government and
laws favoring private industry with equal skepticism” in that
“laws favoring local government … may be directed toward
any number of legitimate goals” while laws favoring in-state
business are “often the product of ‘simple economic protec-
tionism.’”  Finding that the flow-control ordinances “benefit a
clearly public facility, while treating all private companies
exactly the same,” the Court holds that they “do not discrim-
inate against interstate commerce.”  The Court next applies
the test established in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.,20 which
states that the Court “will
uphold a nondiscriminatory
statute like this one ‘unless
the burden imposed on
[interstate] commerce is
clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local bene-
fits.’”  Because “both the
Magistrate Judge and the
District Court could not
detect any disparate impact
on out-of-state as opposed to in-state businesses,” the Court
concludes that “any arguable burden does not exceed the pub-
lic benefits of the ordinances.”
CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In Winkelman v. Parma City School District,21 the Court held
that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
affords parents independent rights to prosecute related claims,
and they may do so on their own behalf.  The petitioner Jacob
Winkelman, represented by his parents, is a child with autism
spectrum disorder.  The respondent Parma City School District
participates in IDEA’s education-spending program and
“accepts federal funds for assistance in the education of chil-
dren with disabilities.”  These funds are conditioned on the
school structuring, with the participation of Jacob’s parents, an
individualized education program (IEP) for Jacob.  Jacob’s par-
ents disagreed with the school’s proposed IEP for the 2003-
2004 school term and sought administrative review.  A hearing
officer rejected their claims, and they appealed to a state-level
review officer.  After the review officer affirmed the hearing
officer’s decision, the petitioners “on their own behalf and on
behalf of Jacob,” filed a complaint, “without the aid of an attor-
ney,” in federal court, where it was rejected.  The petitioners
appealed this decision, and the Sixth Circuit, “[r]elying on its
recent decision in Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School Dist.,22 …
entered an order dismissing the appeal unless petitioners
obtained counsel to represent Jacob.”  Cavanaugh held that in
the IDEA context, the “right to a free appropriate public edu-
cation ‘belongs to the child alone’” and parents rights are
“‘derivative’ of the child’s right.”  The Cavanaugh court con-
cluded that because IDEA “does not abrogate the common-law
rule prohibiting nonlawyer parents from representing minor
children,” parents cannot proceed pro se with IDEA litigation
in federal court.  The Court first notes that several provisions
of IDEA guarantee parents “protections that apply throughout
the IEP process” and another requires the local education
agency to “‘resolv[e] … complaint[s] to the satisfaction of the
parents.’”  The Court also finds that IDEA “sets forth proce-
dures … that, in the Act’s express terms, contemplates parents
will be the parties bringing the … complaints.”  Because “par-
ents enjoy enforceable rights at the administrative stage,” the
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Court holds that “it would
be inconsistent with the
statutory scheme to bar
them from continuing to
assert these rights in federal
court.”  The Court rejects
the respondent’s alternative
interpretation of the statute and concludes that because par-
ents have independent rights under IDEA, “they are … entitled
to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf.”  Therefore, the
Court “need not reach petitioners’ alternative argument, which
concerns whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s
claims pro se.”
In Sole v. Wyner,23 a unanimous Court held that the respon-
dent is not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees because a
plaintiff who wins a preliminary injunction but later loses the
same case on the merits is not a prevailing party.  The respon-
dent T.A. Wyner filed suit against the petitioners, including the
Secretary of Florida’s Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP). She alleged that Florida’s “Bathing Suit Rule,” which
requires that patrons in Florida’s state parks “wear at a mini-
mum, a thong and, if female, a bikini top,” violated her First
Amendment right to engage in artwork that “would consist of
nude individuals assembled into a peace sign.”  The District
Court granted respondent a preliminary injunction and
allowed the DEP to put up a screen, behind which the exhibit
would take place.  However, “the display was set up outside the
barrier, and participants, once disassembled from the peace
symbol formation, went into the water in the nude.” After this
occurrence, the trial continued and respondent sought a per-
manent injunction because she intended to stage a repeat
exhibit the next year.  The District Court granted petitioner’s
motion for summary final judgment, holding that “[t]he delib-
erate failure of Wyner and her coparticipants to remain behind
the screen at the 2003 … display … demonstrated that the
Bathing Suit Rule’s prohibition of nudity was ‘no greater than
is essential….’”  Despite its ruling, the District Court held that
Wyner had prevailing-party status because she initially
obtained the preliminary injunction.  Under 42 U.S.C. section
1988(b), Congress gave federal district courts discretion to
“‘allow the prevailing party … a reasonable attorney’s fee as
part of the costs.’”  Accordingly, the District Court “awarded
[respondent] counsel fees covering the first phase of the litiga-
tion.”  The Court begins by examining the definition of a “pre-
vailing party.”  The Court finds that in the case at hand, “the
preliminary injunction hearing was necessarily hasty and
abbreviated” and that the relief “expired before appellate
review could be gained.”  In this context, the Court holds that
“[t]he final decision in Wyner’s case rejected the same claim
she advanced in her preliminary injunction motion” and that
“her initial victory was ephemeral.”  Therefore, the Court con-
cludes “that a plaintiff who gains a preliminary injunction does
not qualify for an award of counsel fees under §1988(b) if the
merits of the case are ultimately decided against her.”
In Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc.,24 a unanimous
Court held that mere compliance with federal agency regula-
tions, even where an agency closely monitors activities, is not
“acting under” the government for purposes of the federal offi-
cer removal statute.  The petitioners filed suit in state court
against the respondent Philip Morris Companies for allegedly
engaging in “unfair and deceptive business practices” in adver-
tising certain cigarettes as light.  The complaint accuses the
respondent of manipulating its cigarettes’ performance in the
tobacco industry’s Cambridge Filter Method tests “‘to register
lower levels of tar and nicotine … than would be delivered to
the consumers of the product.’”  The respondent removed the
case to Federal District Court under the federal officer removal
statute, which allows the removal of suits against the “United
States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person act-
ing under that officer) of the United States or of any agency
thereof ….”  The petitioner argues that the removal is invalid.
The Court begins its opinion by addressing the extensive his-
tory surrounding the federal officer removal statute.  After ana-
lyzing this background, the Court concludes that the statute
“was ‘[o]bviously … an attempt to protect federal officers from
interference by hostile state courts.’”  Turning to the pertinent
language, the Court finds that “[t]he relevant relationship is
that of a private person ‘acting under’ a federal ‘officer’ or
‘agency’” and that the plain meaning of this “relationship typi-
cally involves ‘subjection, guidance, or control.’”  The Court
reasons that “simply complying with the law” does not fall
under this phrase and would not normally trigger the threat of
state court prejudice that the statute was designed to protect
against.  The Court holds that “a highly regulated firm cannot
find a statutory basis for removal in the fact of federal regula-
tion alone, … even if the private firm’s activities are highly
supervised and monitored.”  Philip Morris contends that in
conducting the cigarette tests, it did more than merely comply
with Government regulations but was acting under “‘delegated
authority’” from the FTC.  The Court points out that no official
delegation of legal authority was ever made from the FTC to
the tobacco industry “to undertake testing on the Government
agency’s behalf.”  The Court concludes that it “can find noth-
ing that warrants treating the FTC/Philip Morris relationship
as distinct from the usual regulator/regulated relationship” and
that this relationship alone “cannot be construed as bringing
Philip Morris within the terms of the statute.”
ABORTION
In Gonzales v. Carhart,25 a 5-4 Court upheld the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003.  Congress passed the Act in
response to Stenberg v. Carhart.26 In Stenberg, the Court invali-
dated a state ban on certain abortion procedures used in later
stages of pregnancy.  While the laws at issue are similar, the
language of the Act is “more precise in its coverage” than the
Stenberg statute and was supported by factual findings from
Congress.  The Act provides in pertinent part that “‘[a]ny
physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce,
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knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion … shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.’”
The term “partial-birth abortion” is defined as a procedure in
which a physician: “deliberately and intentionally vaginally
delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first presen-
tation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother,
or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal
trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the
purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will
kill the partially delivered living fetus.”  The respondents filed
suit in federal court against the Attorney General of the United
States and were awarded permanent injunctions barring
enforcement of the Act in most situations.  The Court begins
by discussing the abortion procedures at issue.  The usual
method for abortion during the second trimester is dilation
and evacuation (D&E), and in a normal D&E procedure, the
doctor will dilate the cervix and insert forceps to grab the fetus
and “[pull] it back through the cervix and vagina.”  The
numerous acts banning partial-birth abortions were motivated
by a variation on this procedure known as intact D&E.  Intact
D&E is similar to regular D&E, but the goal is that the fetus
remains whole.  Normally, the “fetus’ head lodges in the cervix,
and dilation is insufficient to allow it to pass.”  Doctors next
use various methods to evacuate the skull contents and crush
the skull to allow it to pass.  The Court reviews its holdings in
Roe v. Wade27 and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey28 and finds that Casey allows “‘[r]egulations … by which
the State, … express[es] profound respect for the life of the
unborn …, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s
exercise of the right to choose.’” The respondents assert that
“the Act is void for vagueness” and alternatively that “the Act’s
text proscribes all D&Es,” thereby imposing an undue burden.
The Court finds the Act not void for vagueness because it
clearly requires a doctor to vaginally deliver a fetus to an
anatomical landmark, perform an overt act to kill the partially
delivered fetus, and have the requisite scienter in performing
this act for a violation to occur.  The Court also rejects the
respondents’ undue-burden argument because the Act only
prohibits intact D&Es and intent is required.  Next, the Court
addresses whether the Act is unconstitutional because its
“‘purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion….’”  The Court finds that it is
reasonable for Congress to determine that “the abortion meth-
ods it proscribed had a ‘disturbing similarity to the killing of a
newborn infant’” and that the Act “furthers the Government’s
objectives.”  The Court acknowledges that the Act would be
unconstitutional if it “‘subject[ed] [women] to significant
health risks’” but states that the record shows a “documented
medical disagreement whether the Act’s prohibition would
ever impose significant health risks on women” and that this
disagreement is not sufficient to demonstrate sufficient health
risks.  The Court concludes by noting that the Act might still
be open to a proper as-applied challenge but that the facial
challenges at issue will not invalidate it.
BUSINESS LAW
In Credit Suisse Securities
(USA) LLC v. Billing,29 a 7-1
Court held that securities law
precludes the application of
antitrust law to alleged anti-
competitive activities during
the marketing of IPOs because
it is “clearly incompatible”
with antitrust law.  The peti-
tioners are underwriters who
facilitate an initial public offer-
ing (IPO) of shares in a com-
pany.  In doing so, they engage
in “book building” by inter-
viewing potential investors to determine the price and quantity
of shares to be offered.  After this process, the petitioners dis-
cuss arrangements for the offering with the offering company
and then buy shares at a discounted price, which the petitioner
resells to investors at the price determined through book
building, “in effect earning its commission in the process.”
The petitioners were sued by the respondents, a group of 60
investors, for actions during this process, which respondents
allege violated various federal and state antitrust laws, includ-
ing section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The petitioners seek to dis-
miss the complaint “on the ground that federal securities law
impliedly precludes application of antitrust laws to the con-
duct in question.”  The Court first states that the relevant issue
is “whether, given context and likely consequences, there is a
‘clear repugnancy’ between the securities law and the antitrust
complaint—or … whether the two are ‘clearly incompatible.’”
Four factors are critical in this determination: “(1) the exis-
tence of regulatory authority under the securities law to super-
vise the activities in question;” (2) a showing that the regula-
tor “exercise[s] that authority;” (3) a risk of conflict between
the two statutes if both were followed; and (4) the presence of
“practices that lie squarely within an area of financial market
activity that the securities law seeks to regulate.”  The Court
finds that the fourth factor is present because “the activities in
question here … [are] central to the proper functioning of
well-regulated capital markets.”  The Court also finds that the
first and second factors are met because the SEC has “author-
ity to supervise all of the activities here in question” and “has
continuously exercised its legal authority to regulate” this con-
duct.  The central issue is the third factor: whether there is “a
conflict that rises to the level of incompatibility.”  The Court
believes that “there is no practical way to confine antitrust
suits so that they challenge only activity of the kind the
investors seek to target…” and that antitrust courts “are likely
to make unusually serious mistakes in this respect.”  Also, the
Court finds that “any enforcement-related need for an antitrust
lawsuit is unusually small” because the SEC enforces its rules,
and investors can challenge activities and receive damages
under relevant securities law.  Because the four requisite ele-
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ments are present, the Court
concludes that “securities
laws are ‘clearly incompati-
ble’ with the application of
the antitrust laws in this con-
text.”
In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd.,30 an 8-1
Court held that the “strong
inference” standard in the
Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)
requires a plaintiff to allege in his or her complaint “facts ren-
dering an inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausi-
ble opposing inference.”  Congress passed the PSLRA to
“check against abusive litigation by private parties” within the
securities context.  The plaintiffs are required to “‘state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind.’”  The respon-
dents are shareholders who purchased stock in the petitioner
Tellabs, Inc., in 2000 and 2001.  They allege that during this
period, the petitioner Richard Notebaert, acting as CEO and
president of Tellabs, “knowingly misled the public” with false
statements and representations regarding the company.  By
2001, evidence of the company’s troubles came to light, and
the stock price dropped significantly.  The respondents filed a
class-action lawsuit in 2002.  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
held that the “strong inference” requirement is met if a com-
plaint “‘alleges facts from which, if true, a reasonable person
could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent
….”  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict
among the Circuit Courts of Appeals in interpreting this
requirement.  The Court first notes that the PSLRA was par-
tially intended to resolve a split among the circuits regarding
the correct standard for pleading requirements of scienter in a
private party’s securities-related action.  The Court concludes
that it must “prescribe a workable construction of the ‘strong
inference’ standard, a reading geared to the PSLRA’s twin goals:
to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving
investors’ ability to recover on meritorious claims.”   To this
end, the Court states three prescriptions: (1) when deciding a
motion to dismiss, courts must accept the complaint’s alleged
facts as true; (2) courts must examine the complaint and ref-
erenced documents in their entirety; and (3) in applying the
“strong inference” standard, courts “must take into account
plausible opposing inferences.”  In reaching the third prescrip-
tion, the Court rejects the Seventh Circuit’s standard because
the PSLRA does not require plaintiffs “to allege facts from
which an inference of scienter rationally could be drawn” but
more specifically “require[s] plaintiffs to plead with particular-
ity facts that give rise to a ‘strong’—i.e., a powerful or cogent—
inference.”  The Court holds that “[a] complaint will survive
… only if a reasonable person would deem the inference of sci-
enter cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing infer-
ence one could draw from the facts alleged.”  In conclusion,
the Court rejects the Seventh Circuit’s standard, but “do[es]
not decide whether … [respondents’] allegations warrant ‘a
strong inference that [Notebaert and Tellabs] acted with the
required state of mind ….’”
In Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr,31 the Court held
that the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s (FCRA) adverse-action
notice requirement only applies when an action is willful or
reckless and only if the proposed premium rate is above a
“neutral” rate that would apply regardless of the consumer’s
credit report.  The FCRA requires that “‘any person [who]
takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that is
based … on any information contained in a consumer [credit]
report’ must notify the affected customer.”  If a breach of the
statute is willful, a consumer can be awarded actual or statu-
tory damages, and possibly punitive damages. The respondent
Ajene Edo applied for auto insurance from the petitioner
GEICO, who obtained his credit score and offered him a “stan-
dard policy … (at rates higher than the most favorable), which
he accepted.”  Under GEICO’s tiered scheme, Edo was not
offered a “preferred policy,” but the standard policy offered was
no different from the “neutral” rate he would have received
without consideration of his credit report.  GEICO did not
send Edo an adverse-action notice. Edo brought suit alleging a
willful failure to give notice and seeking statutory and punitive
damages.  The respondents Charles Burr and Shannon Massey
were similarly offered higher rates from the petitioner Safeco,
who based these premiums partially on their credit reports.
After Safeco failed to send adverse-action notices, the respon-
dents joined a class action against Safeco.  The Court first
examines the definition of “willful” under FCRA and finds that
under common usage, it includes “reckless disregard.”  The
Court next addresses the initial issue of “whether either com-
pany violated the adverse action requirement at all.”  Under
FCRA, an adverse action can only occur in these circumstances
if “quoting or charging a first-time premium is ‘an increase in
any charge for … any insurance….’”  The Court holds that “the
‘increase’ required for ‘adverse action’… speaks to a disadvan-
tageous rate even with no prior dealing.”  Additionally, the
Court accepts GEICO’s argument “that in order to have
adverse action ‘based on’ a credit report, consideration of the
report must be a necessary precondition for the increased
rate.”  In light of these findings, the Court states that it must
identify “the benchmark for determining whether a first-time
rate is a disadvantageous increase.”  GEICO argues that the
baseline should be the neutral rate obtained by not taking an
applicant’s credit score into account at all.  The Court agrees
because it feels GEICO’s proposed definition is more in keep-
ing with the “based on” causation requirement discussed
above.  The Court holds that because “the initial rate offered to
Edo was the one he would have received if his credit score had
not been taken into account,” GEICO was not required to send
an adverse-action notice.  With regard to Safeco, the Court
finds that the insurer understood the adverse-action notice
requirement as not applying to initial applications for insur-
ance.  The Court holds that because it is clear from the record
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that Safeco did not act recklessly or willfully in this misinter-
pretation of FCRA, it cannot be liable even if its actions other-
wise meet the “adverse action” requirement.
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,32 a 5-4
Court held that vertical price restraints should be judged
under the Sherman Act by the rule of reason and not by a per
se rule of illegality.  The petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc., is a manufacturer of leather goods and acces-
sories.  The respondent, PSKS, Inc., sold the petitioner’s goods
in its retail establishment Kay’s Kloset beginning in 1995.  In
1997, the petitioner began a program under which it “refused
to sell to retailers that discounted [its] goods below suggested
prices.”  In 2002, the petitioner learned that Kay’s Kloset had
violated the policy and asked the respondent to stop.  After it
refused, the petitioner stopped selling to Kay’s Kloset.  The
Respondent sued, alleging that the petitioner had violated
antitrust laws.  The Court begins by examining section 1 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits “‘[e]very contract … in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states.’”  The Court
notes that this has never applied literally, but only to “‘unrea-
sonable restraints’” and that the reasonableness of a particular
contract is usually determined by applying the rule of reason,
under which “‘the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of
a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be pro-
hibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competi-
tion.’”  However, some practices are governed by a per se rule
of illegality because they “‘would always or almost always tend
to restrict competition and decrease output.’”  For example, Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.33 has been inter-
preted as “establishing a per se rule against a vertical agreement
between a manufacturer and its distributor to set minimum
resale prices.”  The Court finds that recent cases have rejected
the “‘formalistic’” reasoning of Dr. Miles in favor an evaluation
of “‘demonstrable economic effect’” and concludes that the Dr.
Miles opinion is insufficient to justify a per se rule.  In under-
taking its own evaluation, the Court finds that in light of the
opposing viewpoints of economists on the subject, “it cannot
be stated with any degree of confidence that resale price main-
tenance ‘always or almost always tend[s] to restrict competi-
tion and decrease output.’”  For this reason, the Court states
that “were [it] considering the issue as an original matter,” it
would apply the rule of reason to vertical price restraints.  The
Court next examines the doctrine of stare decisis, noting that it
is weakened in the context of the Sherman Act because “[f]rom
the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a com-
mon-law statute,” making it more adaptable to “modern
understanding and greater experience.”  In addition, the Court
finds that subsequent decisions have weakened Dr. Miles’s
“‘doctrinal underpinnings.’”  Therefore, the Court overrules Dr.
Miles and holds that vertical price restraints should be evalu-
ated under the rule of reason.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,34 a unanimous Court held
that the respondent’s patent on
an electronic pedal sensor is
void for obviousness because it
can be derived by a person of
ordinary skill from previous
patents.  In 1999, the petitioner
KSR International Company
patented an “adjustable pedal
system for various lines of auto-
mobiles with cable-actuated
throttle controls.”  When KSR
was hired by General Motors
Corporation to manufacture
pedals, it “added a modular sensor” to its previous design to
ensure compatibility.  The respondent Teleflex Incorporated
sued KSR for infringing upon its Engelgau patent.  Claim 4 of
the Engelgau patent “describes a mechanism for combining an
electronic sensor with an adjustable automobile pedal so the
pedal’s position can be transmitted to a computer that controls
the throttle in the vehicle’s engine.”  KSR argued that claim 4’s
content is obvious and that the patent is invalid under the
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. section 103, which “forbids issuance of a
patent” if “the differences between the subject matter sought to
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains.”  The District Court found “‘little
difference’” between the prior art and the Engelgau patent and
concluded that claim 4 was obvious.  However, the “District
Court was not permitted to stop there” because the Federal
Circuit applies a “‘teaching, suggestion, or motivation’ test
(TSM test).”  Under the TSM test, a patent claim can be obvi-
ous only if “‘some motivation or suggestion to combine the
prior art teachings’ can be found in the prior art, the nature of
the problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary
skill in the art.”  The District Court concluded that KSR satis-
fied this test and granted its motion for summary judgment.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
“the District Court had not been strict enough in applying” the
TSM test.  The Court “begin[s] by rejecting the rigid approach
of the Court of Appeals” because its previous “cases have set
forth an expansive and flexible approach.”  The Court next
examines the TSM test, agreeing that “it can be important to
identify a reason that would have prompted a person … to
combine the elements,” but finding that “obviousness analysis
cannot be confined” to such a formalistic test.  The Court finds
the Federal Circuit erred “by holding that courts and patent
examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was
trying to solve” because the correct inquiry is whether it was
obvious to a person of ordinary skill, not the individual paten-
tee.  The Court agrees with the District Court’s finding that
there is little difference between the combination of previous
patents and the Engelgau patent, and “a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art could have combined [a previous patent]
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In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T
Corp.,35 a 7-1 Court held that
Microsoft is not liable for over-
seas patent infringement
because sending a master ver-
sion of software overseas is not
supplying a component from
the United States under section 271(f) of the Patent Act of
1984.  Generally, a patent infringement does not occur “when
a patented product is made and sold in another country.”
However, section 271(f) of the Patent Act of 1984 contains an
exception to this rule “when one ‘supplies … from the United
States,’ for ‘combination’ abroad, a patented invention’s ‘com-
ponents.’”  The respondent AT&T holds a patent on a device
used “for digitally encoding and compressing recorded speech”
and the petitioner Microsoft’s Windows software “has the
potential to infringe AT&T’s patent, because Windows incor-
porates software code that, when installed, enable a computer
to process speech” in this manner.  Microsoft sells master ver-
sions of Windows to overseas manufacturers of computers
who copy this master version and install these copies onto
their products.  In 2001, AT&T sued Microsoft in federal court
for infringing its patent as a result of these foreign installations
of Windows.  Microsoft argues that the master versions sold
were not “‘supplie[d] … from the United States” and were not
“‘component[s]’” covered under section 271(f).  The Court
begins by stating the two issues to be addressed: (1) “[W]hen
… does software qualify as a ‘component’ under §271(f)”; and
(2) “[W]ere ‘components’ of the foreign-made computers
involved in this case ‘supplie[d]’ by Microsoft ‘from the United
States’?”  Turning to the first question, the Court finds that
Windows software in the abstract cannot be combined to
infringe on AT&T’s patent but must be installed from “a com-
puter-readable ‘copy’” in order to do so.  Therefore, the Court
concludes that uninstalled Windows software is not a compo-
nent within the meaning of section 271(f).  Next, the Court
examines the question of whether components were supplied
from the United States.  The Court notes that “the copies of
Windows actually installed on the foreign computers were not
themselves supplied from the Unites States” but were “gener-
ated by third parties outside the United States.”  Because sec-
tion 271(f) is silent on the issue of copying, the Court con-
cludes that this “weighs against a judicial determination that
replication abroad of a master dispatched from the United
States ‘supplies’ the foreign-made copies from the United
States.”
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
In Massachusetts v. E.P.A.,36 a 5-4 Court held that the Clean
Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
to issue regulations governing new-vehicle emissions of green-
house gases.  Under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, the
EPA is required to “prescribe … standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new
motor vehicles, which … cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare ….”  In 1999, several private organizations peti-
tioned the EPA to regulate “‘greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles under §202,’” arguing that these gases
have “accelerated climate change.”  In 2003, the EPA denied
the organizations’ petition, stating that “the Clean Air Act does
not authorize EPA to issue mandatory regulations to address
global climate change” and that even if it did, “it would be
unwise to do so at this time.”  The organizations were joined
by several states and local governments and sought review of
EPA’s denial.  The Court begins by addressing the issue of
standing because at least one petitioner must demonstrate the
requirements of injury, causation, and remedy.  Using
Massachusetts as an example, the Court finds the first require-
ment met because the injuries “associated with climate change
are serious and well recognized.”  With regard to the second,
the Court finds that a reduction in auto emissions could be a
significant step in battling global warming.  Turning to the
remedy requirement, the Court finds that the EPA’s actions
could “slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter
what happens elsewhere.”  Because all three requirements are
met, Massachusetts has standing to challenge the EPA’s deci-
sion.  Turning to the merits of the case, the Court finds that
greenhouse gases are air pollutants within the Act’s broad 
definition and that the EPA has the authority to regulate green-
house-gas emissions from new vehicles.  Finally, the Court
addresses the EPA’s alternative argument that even if it has this
authority, “it would be unwise to do so at this time.”  While
recognizing that the EPA has some discretion under the
statute, the Court states that it “can avoid taking further action
only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute
to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation
as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion.”  Because
the EPA has not met these requirements, the Court holds that
its denial was “‘arbitrary, capricious, … or otherwise not in
accordance with law.’”
In U. S. v. Atlantic Research Corp.,37 a unanimous Court held
that section 107(a)(4)(B) of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA) provides the respondent with a cause of
action against the petitioner for reimbursement of environ-
mental cleanup costs.  CERCLA contains two provisions that
“allow private parties to recover expenses associated with
cleaning up contaminated sites.”  Section 107(a) makes four
categories of potentially responsible parties (PRPs) liable for
“(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
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United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not
inconsistent with the national contingency plan; [and] (B) any
other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan.”  Section 113(f)
additionally “authorizes one PRP to sue another for contribu-
tion in certain circumstances.”  In Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Aviall Services, Inc.,38 the Court held that “a private party could
seek contribution from other liable parties only after having
been sued under §106 or §107(a).”  Cooper, however, left open
the issue of “whether PRPs have rights under §107(a)(4)(B).”
In the instant case, the respondent Atlantic Research was hired
by the petitioner United States to retrofit rocket motors.
During this process, the respondent contaminated nearby “soil
and groundwater,” cleaned the site, and later sought contribu-
tion from the petitioner under sections 107(a) and 113(f).
After the Court’s decision in Cooper, however, the respondent
“amended its complaint to seek relief under §107(a) and fed-
eral common law.”  The Court begins by noting that “[t]he par-
ties’ dispute centers on what ‘other person[s]’ may sue under
§107(a)(4)(B).”  The Court agrees with Atlantic Research that
“subparagraph (B) can be understood only with reference to
subparagraph (A)” and “any other person” includes “anyone
except the United States, a State, or an Indian tribe—the per-
sons listed in subparagraph (A).”  The government argues that
the Court’s “interpretation will create friction between §107(a)
and §113(f).”  The Court rejects this reasoning, noting that it
has “previously recognized that §§107(a) and 113(f) provide
two ‘clearly distinct’ remedies” in that section 113(f) allows a
right to contribution “contingent upon an inequitable distrib-
ution of common liability among liable parties” while section
107(a) “permits recovery of cleanup costs but does not create
a right to contribution.”  The Court concludes that the gov-
ernment’s fears of “friction” are unfounded and that section
107(a)(4)(B) “provides Atlantic Research with a cause of
action.”
In National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,39
a 5-4 Court held that a mandatory provision of the Clean
Water Act of 1972 (CWA) controls a mandatory provision of
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA).  The CWA provides
that the EPA shall administer the review and approval of per-
mits under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) in each state.  A state can apply to take con-
trol of its permitting system, and if it makes a showing of nine
criteria, the EPA “‘shall approve’” its application.  The ESA is
designed to protect endangered species and gives the Fish and
Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) authority to administer the ESA with respect
to species under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior
and the Secretary of Commerce, respectively.  Under section 7
of the ESA, federal agencies must “‘insure that any action
authorized … by such agency … is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species ….’”  In 2002,
Arizona applied to administer its NPDES permitting system,
and the EPA began to consult with FWS regarding the applica-
tion.  FWS found no directly
negative impact on an
endangered species but was
concerned about possible
future impacts.  The EPA
found these possibilities to
be too attenuated and also
believed that they were
legally required to approve
the transfer because Arizona
had met the nine CWA
requirements.  After further
consultation, the EPA
approved the transfer to
Arizona.  The respondents filed a petition “seeking review of
the transfer,” and the petitioners, the National Association of
Home Builders, were granted permission to intervene.  The
respondent Defenders of Wildlife filed a different action, alleg-
ing that the FWS failed to comply with the ESA in issuing its
biological opinion.  The Ninth Circuit consolidated the two
actions, held that the EPA’s decision granting the transfer was
“arbitrary and capricious” and vacated the transfer.  The Court
first notes the strong deference it gives agency decisions.  The
Court disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s determination that the
EPA’s position was “‘internally inconsistent’” because the only
inconsistency the respondent’s can point to is that EPA
“changed [its] mind” over the course of consulting with FWS,
and the EPA was “fully entitled to do” so.  The Court next
examines the statutory conflict between the CWA and the ESA.
The Court believes that a literal application of the ESA would
“‘ad[d] one [additional] requirement’” to the nine already man-
dated by the CWA, reversing its mandatory nature.  The Court
states that later enacted statutes, like the ESA, are normally not
construed to repeal an earlier provision unless such a con-
struction “‘is absolutely necessary … in order that [the] words
[of the later statute] shall have any meaning at all.’””  Applying
this principle, the Court rejects the Ninth Circuit’s broad inter-
pretation of the ESA that would alter the CWA’s mandate.  To
resolve the statutory conflict, the Court looks to the interpre-
tation of the implementing agencies (FSW and NMFS), whose
reading would limit application of section 7 of the ESA to
agency “‘actions in which there is discretionary Federal
involvement or control.’”  The Court finds that deference to
the agencies’ interpretation is warranted because it is a reason-
able reading of the statute.  Therefore, the Court concludes
that because EPA’s decision under the CWA is not discre-
tionary, section 7 of the ESA does not control.
IMMIGRATION
In Lopez v. Gonzales,40 an 8-1 Court held that an offense
qualifying as a felony under state law but only as a misde-
meanor under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) is not a
felony punishable under the CSA.  The petitioner Jose Antonio
Lopez entered the United States illegally in 1986 but became a
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legal permanent resident in 1990.  In 1997, he pleaded guilty
to aiding and abetting another’s possession of cocaine, a state
felony in South Dakota.  After serving 15 months of his five-
year sentence, the petitioner was released and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) began removal proceedings
against him because his conviction was a controlled substance
violation and an aggravated felony. The petitioner contested
the aggravated-felony classification because his conduct is only
a misdemeanor under the CSA.  The immigration judge dis-
agreed because drug possession was a felony under state law.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.  This outcome required the manda-
tory removal of the petitioner, whereas a finding in the peti-
tioner’s favor would leave his removal open for discretionary
cancellation.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
conflicting decisions in the circuits regarding the correct inter-
pretation of the CSA in this regard.  The Court begins by
addressing the statutory language involved.  Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) section 1101(a)(43)(B) defines an
aggravated felony to include “illicit trafficking in a controlled
substance … including a drug trafficking crime ….”  Title 18
defines drug-trafficking crime as “any felony punishable under
the Controlled Substances Act.”  The government argues that
the petitioner’s conduct satisfies this language because it is a
felony, under South Dakota state law, and it is punishable
under the CSA, albeit as a misdemeanor.  The Court rejects this
argument because the plain meaning of “trafficking” would not
include the petitioner’s crime of possession.  The government’s
interpretation is also rejected because it would “render the law
of alien removal … dependent on varying state criminal classi-
fications” where Congress’s intent seems to be quite the oppo-
site.  The Court states that Congress instead likely intended
the law to depend upon the felony and misdemeanor scheme
it establishes in the CSA.  In conclusion, the Court holds “that
a state offense constitutes a ‘felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act’ only if it proscribes conduct pun-
ishable as a felony under that federal law.”
In Gonzales v. Duenes-Alvarez,41 an 8-1 Court held that aid-
ing and abetting theft falls within the definition of a generic
theft for the purposes of removal under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).  The respondent Luis Duenas-Alvarez
is a permanent resident of the United States.  He was con-
victed as an accessory for violating Cal. Veh. Code Ann. sec-
tion 10851(a), which states in the pertinent part: “Any person
who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the
consent of the owner thereof … or any person who is a party
or an accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unau-
thorized taking or stealing, is guilty of a public offense.”  The
government began removal proceedings against the respon-
dent under the INA, which allows for removal of certain aliens
who are convicted of some offenses, including theft.  A
Federal immigration judge found that the respondent was
removable because of his conviction.  The Bureau of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, and the respondent peti-
tioned for review in the
Ninth Circuit.  The Ninth
Circuit remanded the
respondent’s case to the BIA
because of its decision in
Penuliar v. Ashcroft,42 which
held that Cal. Veh. Code
Ann. section 10851(a)
“sweeps more broadly than
generic theft.”  The Court
begins its analysis by noting
the four traditional common-law aiding-and-abetting cate-
gories: (1) first-degree principals; (2) second-degree princi-
pals; (3) accessories before the fact; and (4) accessories after
the fact.  The Court states that the first three categories have
largely merged, and the vast majority of jurisdictions now dis-
tinguish only between principal accessories and accessories
after the fact.  The Court holds that a generic theft offense
covers principal accessories as well as principals.  The Court
next addresses the respondent’s attempt to demonstrate that
the California statute criminalizes conduct that most jurisdic-
tions do not consider “theft.”  The respondent argues that the
statute unconstitutionally makes the accused liable for unin-
tended and unforeseen consequences.  The Court disagrees
and states that such a showing requires “a realistic probability,
not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its
statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a
crime.”  The Court concludes that the respondent has not met
this burden because he has pointed to no cases involving such
a misapplication of the California statute.
In U.S. v. Resendiz-Ponce,43 an 8-1 Court held that an indict-
ment that fails to allege any overt act in an attempt offense is
constitutionally sufficient because it uses the word “attempt”
and describes the time and place of the alleged attempt.  The
respondent Juan Resendiz-Ponce was deported in 1988 and
again in 2002.  He attempted to reenter the country in 2003 by
presenting the photo identification of his cousin and claiming
to be a legal resident of the United States.  The respondent was
charged with violating 8 U.S.C. section 1326(a) for attempting
to reenter the country illegally.  The indictment stated that the
respondent “knowingly and intentionally attempted to enter
the United States of America at or near San Luis in the District
of Arizona, after having been previously denied admission,
excluded, deported, and removed from the United States.”  The
respondent attempted to have the indictment dismissed on the
grounds that it “fail[ed] to allege an essential element, an overt
act, or to state the essential facts of such over act.”  After the
District Court denied the respondent’s motion, he was found
guilty and sentenced to 63 months of imprisonment.  The
Ninth Circuit reversed his conviction, finding that the “omis-
sion of ‘an essential element of the offense is a fatal flaw and
not subject to mere harmless error analysis.’”  The Court
begins by addressing the government’s argument that the
indictment implicitly alleges that the respondent committed
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the requisite overt act “sim-
ply by alleging that ‘he
attempted to enter the
United States.’”  The Court
states that Hamling v. U.S.44
requires two elements for an
indictment to be constitu-
tional: “First, [that it] con-
tains the elements of the
offense charged and fairly
informs a defendant of the
charge against which he
must defend, and second,
[that it] enables him to plead
an acquittal or conviction in
bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.”  The Court
holds that the indictment at issue satisfies both of these
requirements by using the word “attempt” and specifying the
time and place of the alleged attempt.  The Court also notes
that the indictment complies with the Rule 7(c)(1) require-
ment that an indictment “be a plain, concise, and definite writ-
ten statement of the essential facts constituting the offense
charged.”
LABOR LAW
In Beck v. PACE Intern. Union,45 a unanimous Court held
that the petitioner did not breach a fiduciary duty in failing to
fully consider the respondent’s merger proposal.  The peti-
tioner Crown Paper provided a defined-benefit pension plan
for the 2,600 persons employed at its paper mills.  Under a
defined-benefit pension plan, employers take the risk of cover-
ing the pension payments if investments do not pay off but also
benefit if investments provide more than is necessary to cover
the payments.  In 2000, the petitioner filed for bankruptcy and
considered termination of its pension plan under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
through the purchase of annuities.  The respondent PACE
International Union represented the petitioner’s employees
covered under the defined-benefit plans.  Instead of terminat-
ing the pension plan, the respondent proposed a merger with
the PACE Industrial Union Management Pension Fund
(PIUMPF) that would shift all plan assets and liability to
PIUMPF. While examining its pension plan, however, Crown
“discovered that it had overfunded certain of its pension plans,
so that purchasing annuities would allow it to retain a pro-
jected $5 million reversion.”  This reversion would go to
PIUMPF under PACE’s proposed merger.  Crown rejected the
respondent’s merger proposal and decided to terminate its plan
through the purchase of annuities, allowing Crown “to reap
the $5 million reversion in surplus funds.”  In response, PACE
filed suit against Crown in Bankruptcy Court, “alleging that
Crown’s directors had breached their fiduciary duties under
ERISA by neglecting to give diligent consideration to PACE’s
merger proposal.”  The Bankruptcy Court agreed and issued a
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preliminary injunction against Crown, “preventing [it] from
obtaining the $5 million reversion.”  The petitioner appealed
to the District Court, which affirmed, as did the Ninth Circuit.
The Court begins its discussion by noting that under ERISA,
an employer only has a fiduciary duty when acting as plan
administrator as the decision “whether to terminate an ERISA
plan is … immune from ERISA’s fiduciary obligations.” PACE
acknowledges this but “says that its proposed merger was dif-
ferent, because [it] represented a method of terminating the
Crown plans.”  Because ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty in
selecting annuities when terminating a plan, PACE argues this
duty should similarly apply to the merger method of termina-
tion.  In examining this argument, the Court finds that it must
first determine whether the proposed merger is “a permissible
form of plan termination under ERISA.”  The Court states that
section 1341(b)(3)(A) of ERISA contains an exhaustive list of
procedures for terminating pension plans and agrees with peti-
tioner that the merger plan is not included.  The Court further
notes that merger is not explicitly mentioned in the section but
is “expressly provided for in an entirely separate set of statu-
tory sections.”  In light of this interpretation, the Court con-
cludes that the merger is not permissible, and Crown did not
breach a fiduciary duty in not considering PACE’s merger pro-
posal.
In Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,46 a unanimous
Court held that overtime and minimum-wage standards in the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) do not apply to the
respondent because she is a domestic caregiver employed by a
third-party agency, and Department of Labor (DOL) regula-
tions exempt her from these requirements.  The FLSA was
amended by Congress in 1974 “to include many ‘domestic ser-
vice’ employees ….”  However, Congress exempted “any
employee employed in domestic service employment to pro-
vide companionship services for individuals who … are unable
to care for themselves.”  Shortly thereafter, the DOL issued a
regulation limiting the term “domestic service employment” to
employees who work “‘in or about a private home … of the per-
son by whom he or she is employed.”  Another DOL regulation,
the “third-party regulation,” defines exempt companionship
workers as those “‘who are employed by an employer or
agency other than the family or household using their ser-
vices….”  The respondent Evelyn Coke is a domestic worker
“who provides ‘companionship services’ to elderly and infirm
men and women.”  She brought suit against her former
employer, the petitioner Long Island Care at Home, alleging a
failure to compensate her for overtime and minimum wages
that she was entitled to under the FLSA.  The District Court
dismissed her claim, citing the DOL third-party regulation.
The Second Circuit reversed because it found the third-party
regulation “‘unenforceable.’”  The Court begins by noting that
administrative agencies have the power to “‘formulat[e] …
policy … to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress.”  The Court will generally defer to those regulations
if they are reasonable “and in accordance with other applicable
[A] unanimous
Court held that
overtime and 
minimum wage
standards . . . 
do not apply to . . .
a domestic care-
giver employed by
a third-party
agency . . . .
Court Review 131
(e.g., procedural) requirements.”  The Court finds that the
FLSA contains explicit gaps regarding the definitions of
“domestic service employment” and “companionship service,”
and that the DOL has “the power to fill these gaps.”  The
respondent argues that the third-party regulation is unreason-
able because: (1) it “falls outside the scope of Congress’ dele-
gation;” (2) it contradicts another binding regulation; (3) it
does not “[warrant] judicial deference;” and (4) it “was
improperly promulgated.”  The Court rejects the first argu-
ment because the FLSA “language refers broadly to ‘domestic
service employment’ and ‘companionship services.’”  The
Court states that this leaves it to the DOL to “work out the
details of those broad definitions.”  The respondent’s second
argument is that the third-party regulation conflicts with the
DOL regulation defining “domestic service employment.”  The
Court acknowledges a conflict but concludes that the third-
party regulation controls because it believes congressional
intent is more in line with this conclusion.  Also, the Court
states that “normally the specific governs the general” and
finds that the third-party regulation is more specific in its pur-
pose.  The Court rejects the respondent’s third argument
because it finds that the DOL clearly intended the regulation to
be legally binding in that it “used full public notice-and-com-
ment procedures” when passing the regulation and has since
“treated [it] … as a legally binding exercise of its rulemaking
authority.”  In this situation, the Court concludes that “a court
ordinarily assumes that Congress intended it to defer to the
agency’s determination.”  Finally, the respondent argues that
the “notice-and-comment procedure, leading to the promulga-
tion of the third-party regulation, was legally ‘defective’
because notice was inadequate and the [DOL’s] explanation
also inadequate.”  The Court disagrees, finding that the final
third-party regulation was a foreseeable outgrowth of the pro-
posal during the notice-and-comment procedure and that
there is no “significant legal problem with the [DOL’s] expla-
nation for the change.”  For the foregoing reasons, the Court
concludes that the third-party regulation controls.
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The past Term of the Court was one in which it swung tothe right.  A single justice, Justice Anthony Kennedy, madeall the difference—being in the majority in every five-to-
four decision that split along ideological lines.  Cases of particu-
lar interest to state-court judges held that a passenger in a rou-
tine traffic stop is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, that
California’s determinative sentencing law was unconstitutional,
and that the Court’s decision on Crawford v. Washington would
not be applied retroactively on collateral review.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court in Scott v.
Harris,1 which held that a police officer did not violate a pas-
senger’s Fourth Amendment rights by bumping his car off the
road during a high-speed chase.  The petitioner, a Georgia
police officer, joined a high-speed pursuit in progress and
received permission to “take … out” the pursued vehicle.  The
petitioner “applied his push bumper to the rear of respondent’s
vehicle,” and the respondent was paralyzed in the resulting
crash.  The respondent alleged “a violation of his federal con-
stitutional rights, viz. use of excessive force resulting in an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”  After
examining a “videotape capturing the events in question,” the
Court finds that the respondent “plac[ed] police officers and
innocent bystanders alike at great risk of serious injury.”   To
determine the reasonableness of petitioner’s action, the Court
balances “‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the indi-
vidual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’”
After weighing the risks caused by the petitioner’s actions and
the danger that the police officer was trying to eliminate, the
Court concludes that his decision to bump the respondent’s car
was reasonable and that he is entitled to summary judgment.
In Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele,2 the Court held
that a search of the respondents’ house was reasonable despite
the fact that the respondents were of a different race than the
original suspects.  Los Angeles County deputies “obtained a
valid warrant to search a house, … unaware that the suspects
being sought had moved out three months earlier.”  Upon
entering the house at 7:00 a.m., deputies found the respon-
dents Max Rettele and Judy Sadler naked in bed and held them
at gunpoint for one to two minutes before allowing them to
dress and instructing them to wait in the living room.  Within
five minutes, the deputies realized their mistake, apologized,
and left the house.  The respondents claimed that their Fourth
Amendment rights had been violated, but the District Court
held “that the warrant was obtained by proper procedures and
the search was reasonable.”  The Ninth Circuit reversed.  The
Court rejects the Ninth Circuit’s holding because “it is not
uncommon for people of different races to live together,” so
“[w]hen the deputies ordered respondents from their bed, they
had no way of knowing whether the African-American sus-
pects were elsewhere in the house.”  The Court also notes that
“officers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and
to ensure their own safety and the efficacy of the search.”
Because an armed suspect might easily hide a firearm in bed-
ding, the Court finds the officers’ orders to be reasonable under
the circumstances and concludes that the respondents’ consti-
tutional rights were not violated.
In Brendlin v. California,3 a unanimous Court held that a
routine traffic stop subjects a passenger to a Fourth
Amendment seizure in an opinion delivered by Justice Souter.
The petitioner Bruce Brendlin was riding as a passenger in a
car when it was stopped by Deputy Sheriff Robert
Brokenbough.  Deputy Brokenbough recognized the petitioner
and arrested him after verifying that he “was a parole violator
with an outstanding no-bail warrant for his arrest.”  A search
revealed several items in the car that are used to manufacture
methamphetamines. The petitioner moved at trial to suppress
the evidence against him as “fruits of an unconstitutional
seizure,” arguing that the traffic stop unlawfully seized his per-
son.  The Supreme Court of California denied the motion and
held that “a passenger ‘is not seized as a constitutional matter
in the absence of additional circumstances that would indicate
to a reasonable person that he or she was the subject of the …
officer’s investigation or show of authority.’”  The Court begins
by stating that a Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an
officer, “‘by means of physical force or show of authority,’ ter-
minates or restrains [a person’s] freedom of movement.”  The
Court next cites the test established in Unites States v.
Mendenhall,4 which states that a seizure occurs if “‘in view of
all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’”
The Court also notes that prior cases have repeatedly stated in
dicta “that during a traffic stop an officer seizes everyone in the
vehicle, not just the driver” and that the Court has never made
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“any distinction between driver and passenger that would
affect the Fourth Amendment.”  The Court next asks “whether
a reasonable person in Brendlin’s position when the car
stopped would have believed himself free to ‘terminate the
encounter’ between the police and himself.”  In response, the
Court reasons that a passenger “will expect to be subject to
some scrutiny” and will not feel that he or she can simply leave
during the traffic stop.  Therefore, the Court concludes that a
passenger is seized during a routine traffic stop.
SIXTH AMENDMENT
In the decision on Carey v. Musladin by Justice Thomas,5 the
Court held that a state court reasonably applied federal prece-
dent in allowing family members of a murder victim to wear
buttons with the victim’s picture on them during the murder
trial.  The respondent Mathew Musladin was convicted by a
jury of first-degree murder.  Members of the victim’s family
attended some of the trial while wearing buttons with a photo
of the victim on them, and the trial court denied a motion by
the respondent’s counsel to order the family members not to
wear the buttons.  The respondent appealed his conviction and
argued that the court’s decision to allow the buttons deprived
him of his right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.  The
Court of Appeal concluded that under the standard established
in Holbrook v. Flynn,6 the buttons had not “branded defendant
‘with an unmistakable mark of guilt’ in the eyes of the jurors.”
The respondent filed a federal writ of habeas corpus, and the
District Court granted a certificate of appealability on the but-
tons question.  The Ninth Circuit found that the state court’s
decision failed to correctly apply Flynn and Estelle v. Williams7
and reversed.  The Court begins by noting that under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
habeas relief can be granted “if the California Court of Appeal’s
decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of” the Court’s previous holdings.  Williams involved a
defendant who was forced to wear identifiable prison clothing
during his trial.  The Court concluded that this action violated
his Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Flynn addressed the issue
of seating “‘four uniformed state troopers’” immediately
behind the defendant at trial.  The Court held that this pres-
ence did not violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial.  The
Court distinguishes Williams and Flynn from the present case
because they involved government-sponsored actions in con-
trast to the private spectators’ actions of wearing the buttons.
The Court holds that due to a lack of Supreme Court decisions
regarding private spectator’s conduct, the Ninth Circuit erred
in holding that the California Court of Appeal’s ruling was an
unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law.”
In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, a 6-3 Court in
Cunningham v. California8 held that California’s determinative
sentencing law (DSL) violated petitioner John Cunningham’s
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The petitioner was
convicted of continuous
sexual abuse of a child
under the age of 14.  Under
the DSL, this crime requires
“a lower term sentence of 6
years, a middle term sen-
tence of 12 years, or an
upper term sentence of 16
years.”  The DSL mandates
that a trial judge sentence
the defendant to the middle
term unless he finds addi-
tional aggravating or mitigating factors by a preponderance of
the evidence at a sentencing hearing.  In the petitioner’s case,
the judge found six aggravating factors and one mitigating
factor and sentenced petitioner to the upper term sentence of
16 years.  The Court begins its review by examining the his-
tory of the DSL, which was enacted to “promote uniform and
proportionate punishment.”  The Court finds that the DSL fre-
quently uses the term “fact” and requires a preponderance of
the evidence, “a clear factfinding directive.”  The Court states
that it has consistently held that “any fact that exposes a
defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a
jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,9 the Court held that an extended
prison term was not valid when imposed because of a judge’s
finding that the crime was committed “‘with a purpose to
intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of
race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or
ethnicity.’”  The Court finds that although it should be clear
that California’s DSL violates Apprendi’s rule, it must address
the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Black10 to
the contrary.  The Black decision held that the DSL only
allows “‘the type of factfinding that traditionally has been
incident to the judge’s selection of an appropriate sentence.’”
The Court rejects this decision because the Apprendi rule
leaves “no room for such an examination” by a judge.  The
Court concludes that the DSL violates the Sixth Amendment
and notes that it is up to California to adjust its sentencing
system in light of this decision.
In Justice Breyer’s decision on Rita v. U.S.,11 an 8-1 Court
held that the Circuit Courts of Appeals may presume a sen-
tence imposed within a properly determined U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines range is reasonable.  The petitioner Victor Rita was
convicted of perjury, making false statements, and obstructing
justice.  During sentencing, the Guidelines were applied and a
sentencing range of 33-to-41 months was recommended.  The
petitioner raised two arguments for a sentence outside of the
recommended range: (1) that within the Guideline’s frame-
work his case was “atypical” and “falls outside the ‘heartland’
to which the United States Sentencing Commission intends
each individual Guideline to apply;” and (2) that “independent
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of the Guidelines, applica-
tion of the sentencing factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§3553(a) … warrants a
lower sentence.”  The sen-
tencing judge entered a sen-
tence of 33 months, the
Guidelines minimum.  The
Fourth Circuit affirmed and
stated that “‘a sentence
imposed within the properly
calculated Guidelines range … is presumptively reasonable.’”
The Court begins by noting that a presumption of reasonable-
ness “is not binding” and merely reflects the “double determi-
nation” made by the sentencing judge and the Sentencing
Commission that the sentence is reasonable.  In reviewing the
legislative history of the Guidelines, the Court finds that “[t]he
Commission has made a serious, sometimes controversial,
effort to carry out [Congress’s] mandate,” reflecting the dual
goals of uniformity and proportionality, despite the fact that
they sometimes conflict.  The Court concludes that “it is fair to
assume that the Guidelines, insofar as practicable, reflect a
rough approximation of sentences that might achieve
§3553(a)’s objectives.”  The Court also relies upon U.S. v.
Booker,12 which held that a provision of the Guidelines that
made them binding on district courts was unconstitutional.
The Court finds that the Booker opinion “made clear that
today’s holding does not violate the Sixth Amendment” in stat-
ing that “‘the constitutional issues presented … would have
been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted … the provi-
sions that make the Guidelines binding on district judges.’”
The Court concludes that the petitioner’s circumstances do not
“require a sentence lower than the sentence the Guidelines
provide.”
In Whorton v. Bockting,13 a unanimous Court held that its
decision in Crawford v. Washington14 does not apply retroac-
tively to the respondent’s case.  The respondent Marvin
Bockting resided with his wife, Laura, and Laura’s daughter
from a previous relationship, Autumn.  One night Autumn told
her mother that the respondent had sexually abused her.
Laura took Autumn to a hospital where an examination of her
“revealed strong physical evidence of sexual assaults.”
Detective Charles Zinovitch interviewed Autumn while her
mother was present, and she described in detail what the
respondent had allegedly done to her.  The respondent was
arrested and indicted on four counts of sexually assaulting a
minor under 14 years of age.  At trial, Autumn was too
unnerved to testify, and the state moved to allow Laura and
“Detective Zinovitch to recount Autumn’s statements regard-
ing the sexual assaults.”  The trial court admitted the testi-
mony over the defense counsel’s objection, and the respondent
was subsequently convicted of three counts of sexual assault.
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court, relying on Ohio v. Roberts.15 While the respondent’s
appeal to the Ninth Circuit was pending, the Court decided
Crawford, which overruled Roberts, and held that “‘[t]estimo-
nial statements of witnesses absent from trial’ are admissible
‘only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine [the
witness].’”  The respondent contended on appeal that under
Crawford, Autumn’s out-of-court testimony would not have
been admitted.  The Court begins by examining Teague v.
Lane,16 which states that “an old rule applies both on direct
and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable
only to cases that are still on direct review.”  The Court decides
that Crawford announces a new rule because its decision was
not dictated by precedent and was, in fact, contrary to Roberts.
Because Crawford is a new rule, it cannot apply retroactively
unless “it is a ‘“watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure”’ impli-
cating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding.”  This requires showing: (1) that the rule is
needed to prevent “‘an “‘impermissibly large risk’”’ of an inac-
curate conviction” and (2) that the rule “‘alter[s] our under-
standing of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the
fairness of a proceeding.’”  The Court holds that the first
requirement is not satisfied because Crawford’s impact is
uncertain and not significant.  The Court also finds that
Crawford does not meet the second requirement because it
does not effect “a profound and ‘sweeping”’ change.  Therefore,
Crawford does not apply retroactively, and the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit is reversed.
CAPITAL SENTENCING
A 5-4 Court in Ayers v. Belmontes,17 upheld California’s
catchall factor (k) instruction against an Eighth Amendment
challenge.  The respondent Fernando Belmontes was convicted
of first-degree murder.  During sentencing he introduced miti-
gating evidence to demonstrate his ability to positively con-
tribute to society as a prison inmate.  The trial judge’s sentenc-
ing instructions to the jury included California’s catchall factor
(k) instruction that allows the jury to consider “‘[a]ny other
circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even
though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.’”  Based on these
instructions, the respondent was sentenced to death.  The
Court begins its review by considering the previous challenges
to factor (k) in Boyde v. California18 and Brown v. Payton.19
Boyde involved a challenge to factor (k)’s ability to allow jury
consideration of mitigating evidence related to a defendant’s
background or character.  In Payton, the defendant made a
similar argument with respect to postcrime mitigating evi-
dence.  The Court rejected both challenges.  The Court distin-
guishes the present case from Payton in that the federal habeas
petition at issue was filed before the AEDPA deadline, resulting
in a less deferential standard of review.  Therefore, the relevant
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inquiry is “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that pre-
vents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.”
The Court analogizes the respondent’s mitigating evidence to
the precrime evidence in Boyde, concluding that it is well
within the range of consideration that factor (k) allows.
Furthermore, both the respondent and the prosecution dis-
cussed the evidence extensively, and it is “improbable the
jurors believed that the parties were engaging in an exercise in
futility.”  The Court concludes that it is highly unlikely that the
jury felt that it could not consider the mitigating evidence pre-
sented by the respondent regarding his future value as an
inmate.
In Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman20 and its companion case
Brewer v. Quarterman,21 a 5-4 Court held that Texas’s sentencing
instructions in capital cases did not give the jury enough oppor-
tunity to weigh the mitigating evidence presented in each case.
The petitioner Jalil Abdul-Kabir was convicted of capital mur-
der.  At his sentencing hearing, he presented “testimony from
his mother and his aunt, who described his unhappy child-
hood” and testimony from a psychologist that “sought to pro-
vide an explanation for [petitioner’s] behavior that might
reduce his moral culpability.”  The trial court denied the peti-
tioner’s request for special instructions and instead asked the
jury: (1) “Was the conduct of the defendant … committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death
of the deceased … would result?”; and (2) “Is there a probabil-
ity that the defendant … would commit criminal acts of vio-
lence that would constitute a continuing threat to society?”
Under the Texas criminal code, if the jury answers both ques-
tions affirmatively, the judge must impose a death sentence.
The jury answered in the affirmative, and Abdul-Kabir was sen-
tenced to death.  In the companion case, the petitioner Brent
Ray Brewer was convicted of murder.  He presented mitigating
evidence including a recent “bout with depression,” manipula-
tion and domination by his female co-defendant, and abuse of
drugs.  As in Abdul-Kabir’s case, a sentencing jury answered the
sentencing questions affirmatively, and Brewer was sentenced to
death.  The Court begins the Abdul-Kabir opinion by noting
that because the AEDPA applies, it must determine “whether
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ (CCA) adjudication of
[Abdul-Kabir’s] claim on the merits ‘resulted in a decision that
was contrary to … clearly established Federal law.’”  The Court
finds that its precedent clearly establishes that “sentencing
juries must be able to give meaningful consideration and effect
to all mitigating evidence that might provide a basis for refus-
ing to impose the death penalty….”  Turning to the trial court’s
decision, the Court states that the “trial judge did not analyze
[Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I)22],” but instead “relied on three later
Texas cases and on [the Court’s] opinion in Graham v.
Collins.”23 The Court finds that Graham is less relevant to
Abdul-Kabir’s case than Penry I, and the trial court’s use of this
formulation of the issue
“resulted in a decision that
was both ‘contrary to’ and
‘involved an unreasonable
application of’” the Court’s
previous decisions.  The
Court next finds that the
CCA erred in its application
of Penry I because it
“ignored the fact that even
though [Abdul-Kabir’s] mit-
igating evidence may not
have been as persuasive as
Penry’s, it was relevant …
for precisely the same rea-
son.”  The Court concludes that it is conceivable that a juror
could find “himself without a means for giving meaningful effect
to the mitigating qualities” of the presented evidence as man-
dated by Penry I.  Accordingly, the judgment of the Fifth Circuit
denying Abdul-Kabir’s application for a writ of habeas corpus is
reversed, and the case remanded.  In the Brewer opinion, the
Court states that the Fifth Circuit erred in its decision, and the
decision is reversed for the reasons enumerated in the Abdul-
Kabir opinion.
In Smith v. Texas,24 a 5-4 Court held that the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, (CCA) requirement that the petitioner show
egregious harm was an error based “on a misunderstanding of
the federal right” that the petitioner asserted.  The petitioner
LaRoyce Lathair Smith was convicted of first-degree murder.
The sentencing phase of his trial took place between Penry v.
Lynaugh (Penry I),25 and Penry v. Johnson (Penry II).26 During
this interim period, the Texas trial court in Smith’s case
attempted to correct the special jury instructions invalidated in
Penry I by instructing the jury to “nullify the special issues if
the mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, convinced the jury
Smith did not deserve the death penalty.”  Nevertheless, the
jury answered affirmatively to the special instructions, and the
petitioner was sentenced to death.  Following this sentencing
phase, the Court held in Penry II that a similar nullification
charge was “insufficient to cure the flawed special issues.”  The
petitioner sought relief, but the CCA affirmed the denial of
relief.  The Court granted certiorari and reversed in Smith v.
Texas (Smith I).27 On remand, the CCA again denied relief,
holding that petitioner’s “pretrial objections did not preserve
the claim of constitutional error he asserts” and that under
Texas law, “this procedural default required Smith to show
egregious harm—a burden … he did not meet.”  The Court
begins by discussing the CCA’s decision.  The Court disagrees
with the CCA’s egregious-harm requirement because the basis
for reversal in Smith I was that the nullification charge did not
“[cure] the underlying Penry error” and not some separate
error based on the nullification charge itself.  The Court finds
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that the petitioner’s “central
objection at each stage has
been to the special issues”
and that this is sufficient to
preserve his claim of Penry
error as vindicated in Smith I.
Therefore, under the Texas
framework, he is only
required to show “‘some
harm’” from the CCA’s error.  The Court concludes that this
harm exists because the petitioner “has shown there was a rea-
sonable likelihood that the jury interpreted the special issues
to foreclose adequate consideration of his mitigating evi-
dence.”
In Panetti v. Quarterman,28 a 5-4 Court overturned the death
sentence of a mentally ill prisoner.  The petitioner Scott Louis
Panetti killed his wife’s parents in front of his wife and daugh-
ter.  A court-ordered psychiatric evaluation “indicated that
petitioner suffered from a fragmented personality, delusions,
and hallucinations.”  At trial, the petitioner represented him-
self, “claimed he was not guilty by reason of insanity,” and dis-
played very strange behavior.  Afterwards, a jury found him
guilty of murder and sentenced him to death.  After his execu-
tion date was set, the petitioner’s counsel filed a motion claim-
ing “for the first time, that due to mental illness he was incom-
petent to be executed.”  In state court, two court-appointed
mental-health experts evaluated the petitioner and concluded
that he “‘knows that he is to be executed, and that his execu-
tion will result in his death,’ and, moreover, that he ‘has the
ability to understand the reason he is to be executed.’”  Despite
his objections to the evaluation and proceedings, the court
held that the petitioner had not shown he was incompetent to
be executed. The petitioner “returned to federal court,” and
the District Court denied his habeas petition on the grounds
that he “had not shown incompetency as defined by Circuit
precedent.”  In the Supreme Court, the petitioner argues that
under the AEDPA, no deference is due to the state court’s judg-
ment.  The Court agrees with the petitioner because the state
court’s “failure to provide the procedures mandated by Ford v.
Wainwright,29 constituted an unreasonable application of
clearly established law.”  The Court states that the trial court
did not give the petitioner “an adequate means by which to
submit expert psychiatric evidence in response to the evidence
that had been solicited by the state court” and that this is an
unconstitutional error.  After finding that “[t]here is … much
in the record to support the conclusion that petitioner suffers
from severe delusions,” the Court turns to an examination of
the District Court’s holding that the petitioner is competent
enough to be executed because he knows that he committed
the murders, that he will be executed, and that the justification
for his execution is his commission of the murders.  The Court
concludes that the District Court was mistaken because “[i]t is
error to derive from Ford … a strict test for competency that
treats delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware
the State has identified the link between his crime and the pun-
ishment to be inflicted.”
CRIMINAL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A unanimous Court in Jones v. Bock30 rejected the Sixth
Circuit’s interpretation of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PLRA).  The petitioners are three inmates who filed
grievances against prison officials and officers of the Michigan
Department of Corrections.  The PLRA mandates that prison-
ers “exhaust prison grievance procedures before filling suit.”
In interpreting the PLRA, the Sixth Circuit required that proof
of exhaustion be attached to prisoner complaints and also that
the defendants “have been named from the beginning of the
grievance process.”  If both exhausted and unexhausted claims
were pleaded in a single complaint, the Sixth Circuit applied a
“total exhaustion” rule and dismissed the entire suit.  The
Court begins by addressing whether the PLRA requires
exhaustion to be pleaded in the complaint or whether it is an
affirmative defense for the defendant.  The Court finds that
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, exhaustion is usu-
ally treated as an affirmative defense and that there is nothing
explicit or implicit in the PLRA to the contrary.  The respon-
dent, however, contends that the PLRA was meant to deviate
from this traditional framework to effectively reduce the vol-
ume of frivolous prisoner lawsuits.  The Court feels that this
argument proves too much and that “the same could be said
with respect to any affirmative defense.”  The Court holds that
under the PLRA, exhaustion need not be pleaded by an inmate
in his or her complaint, and failure to exhaust is an affirmative
defense.  The Court next turns to the issue of whether inmates
must name all future defendants in their initial grievances.
Finding that “nothing in the statute imposes a ‘name all defen-
dants’ requirement,” the Court holds that “exhaustion is not
per se inadequate simply because an individual later sued is not
named in the grievances.”  Finally, the Court addresses the
Sixth Circuit’s totalexhaustion rule.  The respondents argue
that the PLRA language stating that “‘no action shall be
brought’ unless administrative procedures are exhausted” bars
an entire suit because Congress would have used the term
“claim” instead of “action” if it intended otherwise.  The Court
rejects this argument as reading too much into boilerplate lan-
guage and concludes that the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of
the PLRA is erroneous.
In James v. U. S.,31 a 5-4 Court held that attempted burglary
is a felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s
(ACCA) mandatory minimum sentencing requirement.  The
ACCA provides that any “‘person who violates section 922(g)
… and has three prior convictions … for a violent felony or a
serious drug offense’” is subject to a mandatory minimum sen-
tence of 15 years.  Section 922(g) is violated when a felon is
convicted of possession of a firearm.  A violent felony is
defined under the ACCA as “any crime punishable by impris-
onment for a term exceeding one year … that … (ii) is bur-
glary, arson, or extortion, … or otherwise involves conduct
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that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.”  The petitioner Alphonso James, a previously con-
victed felon, pleaded guilty to violating section 922(g) and had
been convicted of three previous felonies: two serious drug
convictions and one attempted burglary conviction.  At the
petitioner’s trial, the District Court concluded “that attempted
burglary is a violent felony” and applied the ACCA’s minimum
mandatory sentence.  The Court begins by noting that the only
possible way the petitioner’s attempted burglary conviction
qualifies as a violent felony is if it “‘otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.’”  The Court turns to the question of “whether
attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, is an offense that
‘involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of phys-
ical injury to another.’”  The Court finds that the risk of bur-
glary “arises not from completion of the burglary, but from the
possibility that an innocent person might appear while the
crime is in progress” and that attempted burglary “poses the
same kind of risk.”  The Court also notes that every Court of
Appeals that has dealt with an attempted-burglary statute 
similar to Florida’s “has held that the offense qualifies as a ‘vio-
lent felony.’”  The Court concludes that attempted burglary
under the Florida law is a violent felony under ACCA’s resid-
ual provision.
In Wilkie v. Robbins,32 the Court declined to create a new
constitutional cause of action to govern the respondent’s case
and also denied his Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act’s (RICO) claim.  The respondent Frank
Robbins purchased the title to a ranch in Wyoming from
George Nelson.  Nelson had previously granted the United
States an easement to use and maintain a road on the ranch,
but the Bureau of Land Management had failed to record it.
After Bureau employees realized their mistake, they phoned
the respondent and “demanded an easement to replace
Nelson’s.”  The respondent refused, and over the next several
years, he alleges that Bureau employees “carried on a campaign
of harassment and intimidation aimed at forcing him to regrant
the lost easement.”  The respondent filed the instant suit in
1998, alleging that the petitioners violated his Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents,33 which “held that the victim of a Fourth Amendment
violation by federal officers had a claim for damages.”  The
respondent also asserts a RICO claim.  The Court begins with
a brief examination of Bivens, noting that “in most instances
we have found a Bivens remedy unjustified.”  The Court finds
that the respondent “has an administrative … process for vin-
dicating virtually all of his complaints,” but the Court notes
that this does not expressly preclude the creation of a new con-
stitutional cause of action.  The respondent alleges that while
he may have had some remedy for most of the individual inci-
dents, the Bureau’s conduct amounted to “‘death by a thousand
cuts’” and should be treated as a whole.  The Court agrees that
“[t]he whole here is greater than the sum of its parts” but feels
that respondent’s claim is essentially that the government
“went too far” and notes the
inherent difficulty of line-
drawing in such cases.
Therefore, the Court rejects
the respondent’s proposed
Bivens cause of action, find-
ing that it might “be worse
than the disease.”  RICO
makes it illegal for certain
organizations to engage in a
“‘pattern of racketeering
activity,’” including viola-
tions of the Hobbs Act.  The
Court finds that at the time the Hobbs Act was passed, the
crime of extortion dealt mostly with public corruption and not
“the harm caused by overzealous efforts to obtain property on
behalf of the Government.”  For this reason, the Court also dis-
misses the respondent’s RICO claim.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
A 5-4 Court in Lawrence v. Florida,34 held that the AEDPA’s
tolling period for state post-conviction procedures does not
continue to toll during U.S. Supreme Court certiorari petitions.
The petitioner Gary Lawrence was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death.  The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
sentence, and the Court denied certiorari on January 20, 1998.
364 days later, the petitioner filed a petition for post-convic-
tion relief and was denied.  He again petitioned the Court for
certiorari, and while this was pending, he also filed a federal
habeas application.  The Court denied certiorari on March 24,
2003.  The petitioner’s habeas claim was dismissed in the
District Court as untimely under AEDPA section 2244(d),
which contains a one-year statute of limitations for habeas
relief from the judgment of a state court.  Section 2244(d)(2)
states that this “limitations period is tolled while an ‘applica-
tion for State post-conviction or other collateral review … is
pending.’”  The District Court concluded that this period does
not toll during a petition for certiorari.  The District Court held
that the limitations period had run because the petitioner
waited 364 days before filing his petition for postconviction
relief and then an additional 113 before filing his habeas peti-
tion.  The Court begins its analysis by stating that the real issue
“is whether the limitations period was also tolled during the
pendency of Lawrence’s petition for certiorari to this Court.”
The Court feels that a natural reading of the statute’s language
only includes the state-court review process and that the Court
is clearly not part of this process.  The Court further reasons
that under the petitioner’s reading of the AEDPA, no “state
prisoner could exhaust state postconviction remedies without
filing a petition for certiorari.”  However, the Court has previ-
ously held that state procedures are exhausted “at the end of
state-court review.”  The Court concludes by noting that the
petitioner’s position would “provide incentives for state pris-
oners to file certiorari petitions as a delay tactic.”
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In Schriro v. Landrigan,35
a 5-4 Court held that the
respondent’s repeated
requests that his counsel
not present mitigating evi-
dence at his sentencing
hearing provided sufficient
reason for the District
Court to deny his habeas
petition.  The respondent
Jeffrey Landrigan was con-
victed of theft, second-
degree burglary, and felony
murder.  At sentencing, his counsel attempted to submit miti-
gating evidence in the form of testimony from the respondent’s
ex-wife and his mother, but at the respondent’s request, “both
women refused to testify.”  The respondent also interrupted
when other mitigating evidence was brought in by his counsel
and told the judge to “‘bring on’” the death penalty.  The
respondent was sentenced to death.  Citing the ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel standard set forth in Strickland v.
Washington,36 a District Court refused the respondent an evi-
dentiary hearing, finding that he could not make a “colorable
claim” because he “could not demonstrate that he was preju-
diced by any error his counsel may have made.”  The Ninth
Circuit reversed.  The Court begins by addressing the Ninth
Circuit’s application of the AEDPA.  The Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the state court’s finding that the respondent
“instructed his counsel not to introduce any mitigating evi-
dence,” was an “‘unreasonable determination of the facts.’”
Reviewing the record, the Court cites several instances of the
respondent informing his counsel not to present mitigating
evidence and concludes that “the Arizona postconviciton
court’s determination of the facts was reasonable.”  The Court
finds that “[i]f Landrigan issued such an instruction, his coun-
sel’s failure to investigate further could not have been prejudi-
cial under Strickland” and “the District Court was well within
its discretion to determine that … [he] could not develop a fac-
tual record that would entitle him to habeas relief.”  The Court
concludes that the Ninth Circuit “erred in holding that the
District Court abused its discretion in declining to grant
Landrigan an evidentiary hearing.”
In Uttecht v. Brown,37 a 5-4 Court, in a decision delivered by
Justice Kennedy, held that the Ninth Circuit failed to give
proper deference to state-court determinations that a particu-
lar juror would be substantially impaired in performing his or
her juror duties.  The respondent Cal Coburn Brown was sen-
tenced to death in the State of Washington, and the
Washington Supreme Court affirmed his sentence.  He peti-
tioned a District Court for a writ of habeas corpus and was
denied.  The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that “the state
trial court had violated Brown’s Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by excusing” Juror Z on the grounds that
he “could not be impartial in deciding whether to impose a
death sentence.”  The Court begins with an examination of
Witherspoon v. Illinois,38 which held that “‘a sentence of death
cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed … it was chosen
by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced
general objections to the death penalty.’”  However, the Court
points out that Wainwright v. Witt39 adopted a looser standard
for excluding veniremen: “‘[W]hether the juror’s views would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as
a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’”  The
Court next analyzes the voir dire in respondent’s case, finding
that Juror Z “had both serious misunderstandings about his
responsibility as a juror and an attitude toward capital punish-
ment that could have prevented him from returning a death
sentence under the facts of this case.”  The Court also notes
that with regard to the State’s challenge to Juror Z and
“[b]efore the trial court could ask [the respondent] for a
response, the defense volunteered, ‘We have no objection,’”
and Juror Z was subsequently excused.  The Court rejects the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that Juror Z was not substantially
impaired and concludes that “the trial court acted well within
its discretion in granting State’s motion to excuse Juror Z.”  In
conclusion, the Court holds that “[c]ourts reviewing claims of
Witherspoon-Witt error, … especially federal courts considering
habeas petitions, owe deference to the trial court.”
In Fry v. Pliler,40 the Court upheld the Ninth Circuit’s deter-
mination that the petitioner was required to demonstrate sub-
stantial and injurious effect from the trial court’s decision to
exclude testimony.  The petitioner John Francis Fry was con-
victed by a jury of two murders.  At trial he attempted to link
Anthony Hurtz to the homicide.  The trial court excluded the
testimony of his witness Pamela Maples, “who was prepared to
testify that she had heard Hurtz discussing homicides bearing
some resemblance to the murder of the Bells.”  On appeal, the
petitioner contended that the exclusion of Maples’s testimony
“deprived [him] of a fair opportunity to defend himself, in vio-
lation of Chambers v. Mississippi….”41 A federal magistrate
judge recommended denying habeas relief because “‘there
ha[d] been an insufficient showing that the improper exclu-
sion of the testimony … had a substantial and injurious effect
on the jury’s verdict’ under the standard set forth in” Brecht v.
Abrahamson.42 The District Court agreed with the magistrate
judge, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  The Court begins its
opinion with a discussion of the relevant standards of review
under Chapman v. California43 and Brecht.   Chapman “held that
a federal constitutional error can be considered harmless only
if a court is ‘able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.’”  Brecht rejected the Chapman standard for
cases reaching the Court on collateral review and adopted the
more “forgiving” standard from Kotteakos v. U.S.44 that an error
“is harmless unless it ‘“had substantial and injurious effect or
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influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”’”  Therefore, the
question at hand is whether a federal court must apply the
Brecht standard “even if the state appellate court has not found,
as the state appellate court in Brecht had found, that the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman.”
The Court finds that the Brecht decision “clearly assumed that
the Kotteakos standard would apply in virtually all §2254
cases” and concludes that the Ninth Circuit was correct to
apply Brecht.
In Bowles v. Russell,45 a 5-4 Court held that the Sixth Circuit
lacks jurisdiction over the petitioner’s habeas appeal because it
was filed after the 14-day period allowed by statute, despite a
judge’s extension of that period to 17 days.  The petitioner
Keith Bowles was convicted of murder and sentenced to 15
years to life imprisonment.  He filed a federal petition for
habeas corpus on September 5, 2002.  The District Court
denied relief on September 9, 2003, and the petitioner did not
file a timely notice of appeal.  However, on December 12, 2003,
the petitioner moved to “reopen the period during which he
could file his notice of appeal,” relying on Rule 4(a)(6), “which
allows district courts to extend the filing period for 14 days
from the day the district court grants the order to reopen….”
The District Court granted the petitioner’s motion but
extended the time period by 17 days instead of the 14 days
allowed by Rule 4(a)(6). The petitioner filed his notice 16 days
later, within the period granted by the court, but after the 14-
day period had elapsed.  Beginning its review, the Court finds
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that the issue at hand is whether the Sixth Circuit “lacked
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed outside the 14-day
window … but within the longer period granted by the District
Court.”  The Court states that it “has long held that the taking
of an appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and
jurisdictional’” and that “courts of appeals routinely and uni-
formly dismiss untimely appeals for lack of jurisdiction.”
Unlike more flexible court-promulgated rules, the Court finds
that under Rule 4(a)(6), “Congress specifically limited the
amount of time by which district courts can extend the notice-
of-appeal period….”  The Court concludes that the petitioner’s
failure to meet this statutory deadline deprived the Sixth
Circuit of jurisdiction and states that if a rigid rule is unfair,
“Congress may authorize courts to promulgate rules that
excuse compliance with the statutory time limits.”
Charles H. Whitebread (A.B., Princeton
University, 1965; L.L.B., Yale Law School
1968) is the George T. and Harriet E. Pfleger
Professor of Law at the University of Southern
California Law School, where he has taught
since 1981.  Before that, he taught at the
University of Virginia School of Law from  1968
to 1981.  Professor Whitebread gratefully
acknowledges the help of his research assistant, Cris Briscoe.
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2. “There is some debate as to the proper scope of this term (enemy
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with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such.”
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004).
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cussing determination of enemy combatant status that “‘specifi-
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be brought under Department of Defense Control’ and ‘describes
how the military determined that petitioner Hamdi fit the eligibil-
ity requirements applied to enemy combatants for detention.’”
The court rejected the declaration and ruled that it should have
been submitted to the district court.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d
278, 284 (4th Cir., 2002).  Two Newsweek correspondents,
Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman, quoting anonymous
sources, insist alternatively that there was an “informal system”
for detaining American citizens as enemy combatants that was not
planned out, but “evolved in fits and starts.”  Michael Isikoff and
Daniel Klaidman, The Road to the Brig, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 26, 2004),
at 26.  They quote an anonymous source, a “top government attor-
ney,” as saying, “‘There is a sense in which we were making this
up as we went along, . . . .  ‘You have to remember we were deal-
ing with a completely new paradigm: an open-ended conflict, a
stateless enemy and a borderless battlefield.’”  Id. This article will
take the government at its word that such standards do exist and
are used in determining whether to detain American citizens as
enemy combatants, but have not yet been published for national
security or other reasons.  
4. Some writers believe that the hidden standards are part of a Bush
Administration veil of unprecedented secrecy related to govern-
ment acts and proceedings.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Liberties:
Applying a Foreign Intelligence Model to Domestic Law Enforcement,
51 UCLA L. REV. 1619, 1621 (2004) citing Detroit Free Press v.
Ashcroft, 303 F.3d. 681 (6th Cir. 2002); N.J. Media Group v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d. 198 (3d Cir. 2002); Ctr. for Nat’l Security
Studies v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d. 918 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
“We have met the enemy and he is us”
Walt Kelly, “Pogo”
On a clear, blue September morning in 2001, nineteenmen highjacked four commercial airplanes headedtoward the West Coast.  They crashed two into the
World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon
in Northern Virginia, and one into a Pennsylvania field.  In the
wake of the shocking attack, Congress authorized President
Bush to use military force against those who committed the
attack, commencing a “war on terror” that still rages today.  
The government has fought the “war on terror” on many
fronts.  The military is engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq; diplo-
matic overtures have been made to Libya and Pakistan; domes-
tic security is tighter; and safety procedures and citizen values
have changed, perhaps permanently.  American spies gather
intelligence all over the globe while even conversations by
United States citizens are monitored by the National Security
Agency for their content.1 During the course of the “war on
terror,” the United States military and the executive branch
have declared hundreds of individuals to be “unlawful enemy
combatants.”  One of these individuals is an American citizen
captured overseas, and one is an American citizen captured at
an airport in Chicago.
The government has standards for declaring citizens to be
enemy combatants.  There is a system to determine whether to
subject such combatants to the federal courts, or to military
tribunals, or to indefinite detention without charge.
Unfortunately, for the judiciary and the public, the government
has chosen to this point not to share those precise factors, not
even with the Supreme Court.2 The government has declared
in a brief to a circuit court that such standards do, in fact,
exist.3 The standards may be classified for national security
reasons.4 Alternatively, the government may have simply
failed to make the standards public to this point.  In the more
than five years since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
we have moved little closer to understanding what factors the
executive weighs in calculating whether to detain a United
States citizen indefinitely as an enemy combatant.  Until the
government chooses to share this information with the public,
an educated guess of what standards the government uses
must be deduced from the few statements thus far made on the
subject.
This paper will attempt to determine those standards.  The
decision likely involves four factors: (1) association with or
direct support of terrorist organization(s); (2) possession of
intelligence that would aid the United States if divulged via
interrogation; (3) continuing threat to the safety of United
States citizens or the national security of the United States; and
(4) it is in the interest of the United States to detain the person
as an enemy combatant.
The government should openly acknowledge and publish
its standards.  The United States has a storied tradition of mak-
ing punishment fit the crime and of publishing the standards
to which citizens are held.  The standards that the United
States uses to determine that one of its citizens is an enemy
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combatant are not merely important as a diagnostic legal exer-
cise.  At stake is America’s example to developing democracies
of an open, honest, and fair balance of freedom and security.
Many nations look to the United States as a model.  If the
United States hides the standards used to detain citizens, other
nations may use that secrecy to justify their own actions.
This article does not analyze the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Hamdi and Padilla to determine whether the Court made the
right calculus or found the right balance.  Nor does this article
attempt to parse whether the United States may detain non-
citizens indefinitely as enemy combatants or the complex issue
of military tribunals.  Rather this paper attempts to reveal how
the United States justifies detaining her own citizens, some-
times captured on United States soil and sometimes showing
little or no signs of imminent harm.  If these detentions occur
in the shadows, gaining strength and legitimacy in current and
future administrations, more and more American citizens may
find themselves risking loss of civil liberties.  When those who
govern have absolute power to detain those that are a threat to
their government, they may take liberties with that power.  The
United States has not yet published the calculus it uses before
detaining its own citizens.  By determining what those stan-
dards are, the public can hold government to the correct appli-
cation of the standards.  Sunlight on the standards may be our
“best disinfectant.”5
I. THREE UNITED STATES CITIZEN ENEMY-
COMBATANT CASES
Although there have been hundreds of declared enemy
combatants, only two announced detainees are United States
citizens.  The comparison of the two, Yaser Hamdi and Jose
Padilla, as well as John Walker Lindh, a citizen who was not
detained as an enemy combatant, may reveal the standards
used to determine whether to declare a citizen to be an enemy
combatant. 
A.  Yaser Hamdi
Yaser Esam Hamdi, a Saudi national who was born in
Louisiana but left for Saudi Arabia as a young boy, was cap-
tured in late 2001 by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan and
was subsequently turned over to the United States military.6
Hamdi was interrogated and then transported to a United
States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.7 When the gov-
ernment learned that Hamdi was a United States citizen, it
transferred him to a naval brig in Virginia, then to a naval brig
in South Carolina.8 Never charged with a crime, Hamdi
remained in confinement until his October 11, 2004, release to
Saudi Arabia under a plea
agreement.9 The United
States military determined
Hamdi to be an unlawful
enemy combatant, and the
government never brought
criminal or civil charges
against him.  
Hamdi’s father, Esam
Fouad Hamdi, filed a habeas
petition as next friend.10 In
response, the government
filed a declaration from Michael Mobbs, special advisor to the
undersecretary of defense for policy.11 The government chose
not to provide the specific standards used to determine that
Hamdi was an enemy combatant.  The only clue to those stan-
dards comes from the Mobbs declaration.  
After declaring himself familiar with the rules and policy of
detention and combatant status and Hamdi’s situation in par-
ticular, Mobbs wrote that Hamdi traveled to Afghanistan in
July or August 2001, affiliated with the Taliban, and received
weapons training.12 Hamdi’s unit was captured by the
Northern Alliance, to whom he surrendered a Kalashnikov
rifle.13 Hamdi, who spoke English, was interviewed by the
United States military and determined to be an enemy com-
batant, an assessment affirmed by a military screening team.14
In January 2002, the Commander, U.S. Central Command’s
Detainee Review and Screening Team found that Hamdi met
established enemy-combatant criteria.15 The declaration does
not state what those standards and criteria are.
The Eastern District of Virginia ordered the government to
produce certain documents that would validate holding Hamdi
as an enemy combatant.16 The government appealed this deci-
sion to the Fourth Circuit, which reversed and dismissed
Hamdi’s habeas-corpus petition.17 Hamdi’s petition for a
rehearing or a rehearing en banc was denied, but the Supreme
Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit to hear
his appeal.
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Hamdi does not
conclusively determine whether the Constitution always pro-
vides the executive with detention power.  In Hamdi, the Court
ruled that Congress authorized detention by its Authorization
for the Use of Military Force (A.U.M.F.).18 Though the
A.U.M.F. does not specifically authorize detention, “detention
to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a funda-
mental incident of waging war” authorized by the A.U.M.F.19
Necessary and appropriate force includes detaining Taliban
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members.20 Detained citi-
zens must receive notice of
the reasons for their classifi-
cation and be heard before a
neutral decision maker in a
meaningful time and man-
ner to satisfy due-process
requirements.21
Not long after the
Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, Yaser Hamdi was
freed to Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, as part of a plea bargain that required that he renounce
terrorism, surrender his United States passport, agree not to
sue the United States government, and refrain from traveling to
the United States and other denoted areas for some time.22
B.  Jose Padilla
Jose Padilla, also known as Abdullah al-Mujahir, the so-
called “dirty bomber,”23 was arrested May 8, 2002, at O’Hare
International Airport on a federal material-witness warrant
after stepping off of a flight from Pakistan to Chicago.24
Apparently, Padilla was carrying a valid passport at the time,
which he had received two months earlier.25 He cleared immi-
gration and had his passport stamped “admitted.”26 He was
detained at the customs area, where customs agents and then
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents questioned him.27 After
declining to continue the interview without the representation
of an attorney, he was presented with a subpoena issued in the
Southern District of New York.28 Padilla was brought to New
York under federal custody.29 On June 9, 2002, President Bush
directed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to designate
Padilla an enemy combatant and have him detained.30
The government vacated the material-witness warrant and
informed the court it was taking Padilla into military custody.31
The military transported Padilla to the Consolidated Naval
Brig in South Carolina.32 Padilla’s attorney, Donna Newman,
sought a writ of habeas corpus as next friend, and the district
court determined that Padilla had the right to monitored
access to counsel and that the government had the right to
detain a combatant captured in the United States, in review of
which it would apply a “some evidence” standard.33 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court rul-
ing on jurisdiction over Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
but reversed on the merits, stating that although it would grant
the executive great deference, the President did not have con-
gressional authority to detain Padilla; the Second Circuit
remanded with instructions to transfer Padilla to civil authori-
ties for criminal charges.34 On certiorari, the Supreme Court
did not reach the merits of whether the President could detain
American citizens captured within the United States as enemy
combatants, but instead remanded to the district court to dis-
miss without prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction.35 The Court
ruled that the commander of Padilla’s brig was the proper
respondent to a habeas-corpus motion.36
Like in Hamdi’s petition, the government submitted a dec-
laration from Michael Mobbs.  Mobbs recited his qualifications
within the government and said that he had reviewed Padilla’s
file.37 Mobbs’s declaration reveals the information given to
President Bush before he determined Padilla to be an enemy
combatant.  Padilla was born in New York, convicted of mur-
der in approximately 1983, and imprisoned until age 18, after
which he was convicted of a handgun charge and impris-
oned.38 Padilla converted to Islam in prison.39 He traveled to
Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan, where he asso-
ciated with members and leaders of Al Qaida and met with Abu
Zubaydeh (a senior lieutenant of Osama bin Laden).40 Along
with an unnamed associate, Padilla “approached Zubaydeh
with their proposal to conduct terrorist operations within the
United States.  Zubaydeh directed Padilla and his associate to
travel to Pakistan for training from Al Qaida operatives in
wiring explosives.”41 Padilla researched uranium-enhanced
explosives and planned to “build and detonate a ‘radiological
dispersal device’ (also known as a dirty bomb) within the
United States, possibly in Washington, DC.”42 This plan was
still in the planning stages and Padilla had other plans to
explode gas stations and hotel rooms.43 The declaration does
not reflect Padilla’s ability to actually carry out any of the dis-
cussed operations, how close he was to beginning his opera-
tions, or whether the information and training he had received
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from Al Qaeda was anything
more than common knowl-
edge about explosives.
In July 2004, Padilla filed
a petition for habeas corpus
in the District of South
Carolina, where he was still
being held in a military
brig.44 The district court
found that while the
A.U.M.F. made Hamdi’s
detention on the battlefield of Afghanistan appropriate, detain-
ing Padilla in a United States airport was not equally appropri-
ate.45 Padilla, captured domestically, had his terrorist plans
thwarted by the capture, and there “were no impediments
whatsoever to the government bringing charges against him
for any one or all of the array of heinous crimes that he has
been effectively accused of committing.”46 The court listed
several federal laws that the government could use to prose-
cute Padilla, instead of endless detention.47 The district court
thus concluded that the A.U.M.F. did not authorize detention
of an American citizen captured domestically and that this
enemy-combatant detention violated the non-detention act.48
The Fourth Circuit disagreed.  In reversing the district
court, the circuit concluded that the President possesses
authority to detain a United States citizen captured domesti-
cally as an enemy combatant pursuant to the A.U.M.F.49 The
court went on to find no “difference in principle” between
Hamdi and Padilla.50 In reversal, the circuit court denied that
the simple availability of the criminal laws cited by the district
court is determinative of the detention power “if for no other
reason than that criminal prosecution may well not achieve the
very purpose for which detention is authorized in the first
place—the prevention of return to the field of battle.”51 The
court added that requiring the government to use the criminal-
justice system would “impede the Executive in its efforts to
gather intelligence from the detainee and to restrict the
detainee’s communication with confederates so as to ensure
that the detainee does not pose a continuing threat to national
security even as he is confined.”52
Padilla appealed to the Supreme Court, and the case seemed
on a sure track to consideration when the government indicted
Padilla in a federal court in Miami, Florida, and sought his
transfer from military detention to the federal prison system.
The indictment did not repeat the familiar accusation that
Padilla would attempt to detonate a “dirty bomb” in an
American city, but instead argued that he was part of a “‘North
American support cell’ to send ‘money, physical assets and new
recruits overseas to engage in acts of terrorism and that he had
traveled abroad himself to become ‘a violent jihadist.’”53
The Fourth Circuit did not take kindly to the government’s
decision to place Padilla in the civilian criminal-justice system
after its strong opinion upholding the government’s right to
detain United States citizens as enemy combatants.  The judges
refused to approve Padilla’s transfer, calling that transfer and
the request that the Fourth Circuit withdraw its opinion a
compounding of “what is, in the absence of explanation, at
least an appearance that the government may be attempting to
avoid consideration of our decision by the Supreme Court.”54
The opinion excoriated the government at several different
points for an apparent effort to avoid the potential that the
Supreme Court would reverse the earlier Fourth Circuit deci-
sion and further restrict the government’s power to detain
United States citizens.55 The Supreme Court reversed and
ordered that the unopposed request to transfer Padilla to civil-
ian custody be approved; the Court said that it would “con-
sider the pending petition for certiorari in due course,” but
later denied certiorari.56 In August 2007, Padilla was con-
victed in a federal jury trial in Florida on terrorism conspiracy
charges.57
C.  John Walker Lindh
American citizen John Walker Lindh was captured in
Afghanistan on December 1, 2001, fighting for the Taliban
against the Northern Alliance, a United States ally.58 Lindh
grew up in affluent Marin County, California, and was named
after Beatles singer John Lennon and United States Supreme
Court Justice John Marshall.59 Between the ages of 16 and 18,
Lindh converted to Islam, referred to himself as Sulayman Al-
Lindh, and left for Yemen to learn the language of the Koran.60
Lindh’s parents supported him on this journey.61
A month after the U.S.S. Cole was bombed,62 Lindh left
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Yemen to attend an Islamic Madrasah in Bannu, Pakistan.63
Lindh trained in a camp in Pakistan of the Harakat ul-
Mujahideen (designated in 1997 by the United States as a for-
eign terrorist organization) as well as other training camps.64
He met and spoke with Osama bin Laden, but when asked,
chose to decline an offer to participate in bombing operations
against the United States, Israel, and Europe.65 Lindh received
weapons training and training in “orientating, navigation,
explosives, and battlefield combat.”66 When he was captured,
Lindh was interrogated but was not declared an enemy com-
batant.  Instead, he was transported to the United States and
charged with a 10-count federal indictment in the Eastern
District of Virginia.67 The district court denied Lindh’s motion
to be treated as a lawful combatant, reasoning that on February
7, 2002 (after Lindh’s capture), the President had declared all
members of the Taliban to be unlawful combatants as he was
authorized to do by the “Authorization for Use of Military
Force.”68 Rather than go to trial, Lindh and the government
reached a plea bargain reflected in his October 4, 2002 sen-
tencing.69
II. STANDARDS AND CRITERIA USED BY THE U.S. TO
DETERMINE ENEMY-COMBATANT STATUS
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, the executive estab-
lished rules and standards for detaining enemy combatants.  It
had been many years since a citizen was declared an enemy
combatant, and that was a different situation.  In World War II,
America had clear enemies with uniformed armies and terri-
tory.  Conversely, the “war on terror” is linguistically a war on
a tactic (terrorism), not a war against a nation or people
(Afghanistan or Southern Confederates).  
The government has admitted that “‘given its unconven-
tional nature, the current conflict is unlikely to end with a for-
mal cease-fire agreement.’”70 The “war on terror” is a war that
will have no clear end.  Soon after the attacks, the White House
made a clear statement on detention, treatment, and trial of
noncitizens captured as part
of the “war on terror,”71 but
did not publish standards
about detention, treatment,
or trial of similarly captured
citizens.  The executive
branch’s only other pub-
lished standards also involve
only noncitizen enemy com-
batants.72 In the Military
Commissions Act of 2006,73
Congress defined unlawful enemy combatants74 for the pur-
pose of exposure to trial by military commissions75 and
removal of habeas-corpus jurisdiction,76 but only as applied to
alien unlawful-enemy combatants.
The President’s advisors likely constructed the authority to
detain citizens as enemy combatants based on the Court’s
Quirin decision, which stated “[c]itizenship in the United
States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him of the con-
sequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in vio-
lation of the law of war.”77 While the standards for declaring
a citizen to be an enemy combatant have not been published,
former Attorney General and Counsel to the President Alberto
Gonzalez discussed the system in place to determine status of
citizens.  The Department of Justice “first reviews each case to
determine whether a citizen meets the criteria to be an ‘enemy
combatant.’  After that . . . the secretary of defense and the CIA
both review the case, and then turn it back to the attorney gen-
eral for a second review” by Justice.78 There is a separate fac-
tual review by the Criminal Division of the Justice Department,
after which the attorney general provides legal advice to the
defense secretary on enemy-combatant classification.79 A
package is sent to the President for a final decision on enemy-
combatant status.80 Gonzalez claimed in his speech that there
was no “rigid process for making [enemy-combatant] determi-
nations.”81 Though Gonzalez described the system for making
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on September 18, 2001, seven days after the attacks.  See Stephen I.
Vladeck, The Detention Power 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 184-187
(2004) (discussing amendments made to the A.U.M.F. by the Senate
before passage, which removed the language “to deter and pre-empt
any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States”
and arguing that the A.U.M.F. does not allow for detentions of any-
one, especially not U.S. citizens).
83. 10 U.S.C. § 956(5) (2004).  See Vladeck, supra note 82, at 187-192
(detailing the statutory history of 10 U.S.C. § 956 and revealing that
the language used relating to prisoners and persons in custody has
been in use since before the 1971 enactment of 18 U.S.C. 4001(a),
and, in fact, the language was “first codified in an emergency sup-
plemental appropriations act passed…on December 17, 1941, just
ten days after Pearl Harbor,” necessary because on December 12,
1941, President Roosevelt had issued an executive order relating to
national defense, which would eventually take the form of
Executive Order 9066, authorizing the creation of military areas to
restrict the movement of Japanese-Americans).  That is to say that
some of the original prisoners that 10 U.S.C. section 956 were
enacted to control were American citizens of Japanese descent being
held in internment camps.  Half a century later, the government is
using the descendent of that statute to validate detention of
American citizens.  See Generally Nat Hentoff, Op-Ed Sweet
Land of Liberty WASH. TIMES (Sep. 9, 2002), at A19; Anita
Ramasastry, Why Ashcroft’s Plan to Create Internment Camps for
Alleged Enemy Combatants Is Wrong, Find Law Forum, CABLE
NEWS NETWORK WEBSITE (Sept. 4, 2002), available at,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/columns/fl.ramasastry.d
etainees/ (last visited, Feb. 25, 2007); Jess Bravin, More Terror
Suspects May Sit in Limbo, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2002), at 4 (dis-
cussing Attorney General John Ashcroft’s short-lived plan in
2002 to create internment camps within the United States to
house citizens who would be declared enemy combatants).
84. 18 U.S.C. 4001 (2004).
85. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519-524.
86. See Generally David Cole, The New McCarthyism:  Repeating
History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1
(2003) (discussing the government’s tactics in the “war on ter-
ror” as an “evolution of political repression” and detailing the
manner in which these restrictions may violate the First
Amendment right to assemble).
87. Since this is dicta, and not an issue decided in the Hamdi rul-
ing, this may not be the final word on the subject.
88. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (emphasis added).
the determination and how
different segments of the
executive branch commu-
nicate in making the deter-
mination, he did not detail
the standards that the exec-
utive branch uses in mak-
ing the determinations.
That most important aspect
still remains veiled from
the public’s view.
The executive believes
that statutory authority to detain citizens as enemy combatants
derives from two statutes, the “Authorization for Use of Military
Force”82 and “Armed Forces General Military Law: Military
Correctional Facilities.”83 In 1971, Congress amended the
United States Code in this area because, in looking back at what
happened to Japanese-Americans in internment camps, it
wished to declare the intent of Congress that “[n]o citizen shall
be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except
pursuant to an Act of Congress.”84 The Hamdi Court accepted
the argument that detention of individuals declared to be enemy
combatants for the duration of the conflict during which they
are captured is part of the President’s authorized use of military
force.85 This article, accepting the Court’s analysis that the exec-
utive has such a power, concentrates on the standards used to
apply the power.
Although the standards have not been published or made
available, an analysis of the accusations against citizen enemy
combatants seems to yield four factors that the executive con-
siders in making a determination that a citizen is an enemy com-
batant.  Those factors are: (1) association with or direct support
of terrorist organization(s); (2) possession of intelligence that
would aid the United States if divulged via interrogation; (3)
continuing threat to the safety of United States citizens or the
national security of the United States; and (4) it is in the inter-
est of the United States to detain as an enemy combatant.
A. Factor I:  Association with or Direct Support of
Terrorist Organization(s)
It is unclear what level of association or support of a terror-
ist group is necessary to trigger enemy-combatant status.  It is
also unclear whether this factor violates the First Amendment
right to association.86 Padilla is alleged to have met with Al
Qaeda leaders and plotted ways to trigger a dirty bomb in an
American city.  Hamdi is alleged to have fought for the Taliban,
but there is no evidence that he affiliated with Al Qaeda.  In
contrast, Lindh trained with Harakat ul-Mujahideen and met
with Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.  It is not apparent why
Hamdi’s association with the Taliban triggered enemy-combat-
ant status while Lindh’s association with two declared terrorist
groups, one of which attacked America on September 11, did
not.  Though association with or support of a terrorist organi-
zation seems to be a factor that the government considers in
determining whether to detain a United States citizen as an
enemy combatant, the amount of contact or support necessary
to trigger this determination is unclear from the small sample
of cases discussed here.
B. Factor II:  Possession of Intelligence That Would
Aid the United States If Divulged
The Supreme Court, in dicta,87 has hinted that the mere
possibility of interrogation may not be sufficient for indefinite
detention of an enemy combatant:  “Certainly, we agree that
indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not
authorized.”88 This is curious, as the Fourth Circuit under-
stood that it was because the government believed “that
Hamdi’s detention is necessary for intelligence gathering
efforts, [that] the United States has determined that Hamdi
should continue to be detained as an enemy combatant in
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89. Hamdi, 296 F.3d. at 280.
90. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added).
91. U.S. CONST., amend. V.  “. . . nor shall [a person] be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”
92. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 1621-1630, 1642-1643 (2004)
(discussing erosion of the bright line between government powers
previously used only in foreign operations, and their application
by the Bush Administration to domestic actions, and listing exam-
ples).  See also Taylor, supra note 78, at 28-29 (2004) (the gov-
ernment’s position, during oral arguments in Padilla’s Second
Circuit hearing, was that since al Qaeda attacked in the United
States, the United States should be included in the “war on terror”
battlefield); John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism,
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 429 (2003) (“In previous American
conflicts, hostilities were limited to a foreign battlefield while the
United States’ home front remained safe behind two oceans.  In
this conflict, the battlefield can occur anywhere, and there can be
no strict division between the front and home”).
93. For instance, knowledge of chemical, biological, or nuclear
weapons and the ability to utilize that knowledge toward immi-
nent destructive ends would represent a continuing threat.
accordance with the laws and customs of war.”89 The govern-
ment should cite another purpose besides that of interrogation
if they are to hold an enemy combatant indefinitely without
charge or trial.  This dicta was written after both Hamdi and
Padilla were declared to be enemy combatants, so it is possible
that interrogation was the sole purpose for detaining one or
both as enemy combatants, but that standard alone should not
be used prospectively to detain citizens as enemy combatants.
In the same opinion, the Court acknowledged the “weighty
and sensitive governmental interest in ensuring that those who
have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return
to battle against the United States.”90 This statement values
detention in the case of a ticking time-bomb-type detainee over
the simple intelligence value of a detainee.
It is noteworthy that there is no public record of other citi-
zens being declared enemy combatants in the years after
Hamdi and Padilla were detained, even though others were
arrested while planning or attempting to execute attacks or for
aiding or supporting terrorist groups.
Though there is no conclusive evidence that this is the case,
perhaps the mere threat of being declared an enemy combatant
is enough to encourage a captured citizen to cooperate and
provide any information the government desires, lest they be
swept off to a military brig in South Carolina.  Simple human
nature may cause a detainee to choose to assist the government
and take their chances in the civilian criminal-justice system,
rather than risk refusing to cooperate and facing enemy-com-
batant detention in a military brig.  
It is an open question whether such a threat, if it is used or
implied, is proper.  While citizens faced with the possibility of
being held incommunicado may be more likely to provide
information that can be used to protect and save lives, there are
two dangers that may accompany such protection.  One dan-
ger is the loss of the Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-
incrimination,91 which is eviscerated by such a threat.  While
those being interrogated still have the right to remain silent,
doing so may cost them other constitutional rights, and so may
not be a practical option.  The other danger is a creeping
expansion of the use of the threat.92 There is no clear backstop
for which the threat of a declaration of enemy combatant sta-
tus could not be used to soften up a suspect.  If the government
arrests a petty thief and member of a local Islamic organization
that has sent funds to al Qaeda, who possesses intelligence
about the organization, the threat of enemy-combatant deten-
tion could be used to force an allocution and plea.  Although
the charge, burglary or larceny,
may have nothing to do with the
suspect’s beliefs on terrorism or
his financing of terrorist organi-
zations, he would fit all the
parameters discussed earlier:
association with and support of
a terrorist organization, posses-
sion of intelligence that would
aid the United States if divulged,
continued threat to safety of
United States citizens, and
detention being in the interest of
the United States.  We must
carefully draw the line to ensure
that criminals who are not
themselves terrorists are not threatened with a declaration of
enemy-combatant status.
C. Factor III:  Continuing Threat to the Safety of
United States Citizens
It is difficult for the government to determine with certainty
that a person is a continuing threat, and it is just as difficult to
determine when that person is no longer a threat.  This factor,
like that of “association” or “support of a terrorist organiza-
tion,” is mainly gray area.  No available standards reveal just
how dangerous a threat must be to require detention.  
Could it be that the level of threat a person presents requires
a crude cost-benefit-type analysis that involves multiplying the
number of people in danger by the time remaining until their
harm?  At a certain level, the amount of harm multiplied by its
imminence is so grave that the government must detain the cit-
izen indefinitely.  Yet it is not clear how the government could
value each factor.  Would they first detain a terrorist who will
kill ten people in one hour, one who would kill 100 people in
a year, or one who would kill 1,000 people in ten years?
Which presents the greater threat to society?  How can the
government determine when the threat has passed?  
If the person possesses knowledge that continues to present
a danger no matter how long he or she is detained,93 may the
government detain that person for life without adjudication?
The executive may feel it has no choice.  Since presentation of
continuing danger is extremely subjective, the government
must reveal its standards so as to ensure honest and consistent
application.
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D. Factor IV:  Detention Is
in the Interests of the
United States
This final factor is the
scariest for civil libertarians
and open-government sup-
porters.  It is nearly impossi-
ble to quantify when the
“interests” of the United
States merit detaining a citizen as an enemy combatant.  The
fourth factor may even subsume the first three.  This factor,
when combined with the other abstract factors, provides the
government with too much leniency in making a determina-
tion.  If the President is empowered to determine both what the
standards are for the interests of the United States and who
among us fit the standards, he or she acts as legislator, execu-
tive, and judiciary.  Too much power is concentrated in the
executive branch in making such determinations using broad,
unpublished standards.
Some argue that the government detained Hamdi and
Padilla as enemy combatants because they did not have suffi-
cient evidence to ensure a conviction in an Article III court.94
The secrecy that surrounded the two detained citizens leaves
no public record of the evidence that the government had on
either man outside of the Mobbs declarations.  Others who
associate or support terrorist organizations, or have intelli-
gence value, or are a continuing threat to the United States,
have been tried in federal courts.  Yet Hamdi and initially
Padilla were not.  
The only evidence the government initially provided, even
to the Supreme Court, was a declaration that was essentially a
hearsay review of the detainee’s files, meaning that it was pos-
sible that the government did not have enough evidence on
either man to satisfy federal evidentiary requirements.  This
would be a drastic accusation against the government, but
Hamdi’s release soon after the Supreme Court ruled that he had
a right to judicial review certainly does not negate it.  Padilla’s
transfer to a civilian court in Florida to face a federal indict-
ment just before the government’s briefs were due in his appeal
to the Supreme Court seemed not to, either, but he has since
been convicted of conspiracy to commit several terrorist acts.   
In both cases, the government argued vehemently that it
must detain these individuals, in military prisons and without
access to counsel, because of their grave danger to society.  Yet
in both cases, when it appeared as though the courts would
find a lack of evidence or force the government to defend these
detentions, the government quickly shifted course and either
released the detainee or transferred them back to the civilian
criminal-justice system that it had previously called
unequipped to handle such a detainee.  If history proves this
theory correct in documents released in the future and mem-
oirs written by today’s decision makers, many Americans may
lose faith in our system of justice.  Few would trust an execu-
tive branch that perversely seeks to indefinitely detain citizens
for which it does not have evidence sufficient to try and convict
in the civilian criminal-justice system.
To this end, Hamdi and Padilla are not the only individuals
accused of nefarious acts and attempted acts of terrorism.
Several other citizens and noncitizens of equal or greater dan-
ger and intelligence value were tried in federal courts.  Both
Richard Reid, who attempted to destroy an American Airlines
flight from Paris to Miami via a crudely made shoe bomb,95 and
his accomplice, Saajid Badat, who possessed explosives in his
home and allegedly assisted Reid while planning his own shoe
bombing at a later date,96 were arrested and charged in federal
court.  Ryan Anderson, a member of the National Guard, was
arrested before deployment to Iraq on “criminal charges of aid-
ing the enemy by wrongfully attempting to communicate and
give intelligence to the al Qaeda terrorist network.”97 Yassin
Muhiddin Aref and Mohammed Mosharref Hossain, members
of a mosque in Albany, New York, who were accused of
attempting to sell to terrorists a shoulder-fired grenade
launcher, were charged in federal court with “concealing mate-
rial support for terrorism and participating in a money-laun-
dering conspiracy.”98 Gale Nettles, a convicted felon who used
the name Ben Laden, was arrested and charged in federal court
after filling a rented storage facility with 500 pounds of fertil-
izer that he intended to use to bomb the Dirksen Federal
Courthouse building in Chicago, a clear attempt at domestic
terrorism.99 Ramzi Yousef, convicted in federal court for mas-
terminding the 1993 truck bombing of the World Trade
Center, was never declared to be an enemy combatant,
although Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz wished
to have him so declared.100
It is a mystery why these individuals, some of whom were
further along in planning a terrorist act, or even caught in the
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94. Newsweek correspondents Michael Isikoff and Daniel Klaidman
reported based on anonymous sources that after Padilla was
arrested at O’Hare airport and transported to New York on a mate-
rial-witness warrant, “prosecutors soon realized they didn’t have
enough evidence to charge him with any crime. To avoid releasing
him, Bush decreed on June 9 that Padilla, too, was an enemy com-
batant. He was sent to a military brig in South Carolina.”  Isikoff
and Klaidman, supra note 3, at 26.
95. Fred Bayles, Judge to Bomber: You’re No Big Deal, USA TODAY (Jan,
31, 2003), at 1A.
96. Associated Press, Alleged Conspirator Charged, WASH. POST (Oct.
5, 2004), at A02.
97. CBS/Associated Press, Army:  GI Wanted to Help Al Qaida, CBS
NEWS WEBSITE, (Feb. 13, 2004) available at http://www
.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/12/national/main599982.shtml
(last visited, Feb. 25, 2007).
98. Jonathan Finer and Dan Eggen, Two Leaders of Mosque Arrested in
Albany Sting, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2004), at A03.
99. Matt O’Connor and Glenn Jeffers, FBI Aids Suspect in Catching
Himself: An Ex-Con Is Accused of Plotting to Blow up the Dirksen
Building, but U.S. Agents Were Clued in from the Start, CHIC. TRIB.
(Aug. 6, 2004), at 1.
100. Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, The Enemy Within:  How the
Pentagon Considered Expanding its Controversial ‘Enemy
Combatant’ Label in a Bid to Prove Links between Iraq and Al
Qaeda, NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE (Apr. 21, 2004), available at
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4799686/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
101. The District of South Carolina addressed this issue in its Padilla
opinion.  “As for concerns about national security during the
judicial process, it is axiomatic that the government has a legit-
imate interest in the protection of the classified information that
may be necessarily be used in the prosecution of an alleged ter-
rorist such as Petitioner. This Court is of the firm opinion, how-
ever, that federal law provides robust protection of any such
information. E.g. The Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA), 18 U.S.C. App. III.”  Padilla, 389 F. Supp.2d. at 692
n.13.  The district court added that enemy-combatant detention
is not necessary “because the criminal justice system provides
for the detention power.  Nothing makes that clearer than the
facts of this case.  There was a warrant issued from a grand jury
for Mr. Padilla’s arrest.  Mr. Padilla was arrested by law enforce-
ment officials, civilian law enforcement officials.  He was
brought before a civilian judge.  He was imprisoned in a civilian
facility in New York.  Everything occurred according to the civil-
ian process in the way it is supposed to.  And it’s not only not
necessary, but not appropriate.  It’s not appropriate because it
directly conflicts with the limits on detention that Congress has
set by statute and the limits that the framers set on presidential
power.”  Id. at 686.
102. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 560-561.
103. One also could find it on the White House website.  The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary (Nov. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-
27.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).  
104. Peter Raven-Hansen, Detaining Combatants by Law or by Order?
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831, 846-847 (2004).
105. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 119 (1866).
act, like the “shoe bomber” Reid, were not declared enemy
combatants.  Perhaps an aspect of Padilla’s detention was so
dangerous that if revealed, it would present a grave danger.
Perhaps that danger has passed, allowing Padilla to be tried in
federal court.  Perhaps the evidence initially used to hold
Padilla as an enemy combatant was insufficient to attain a con-
viction in federal court.  Or perhaps a threat of an enemy-com-
batant declaration has been sufficient to elicit cooperation
from all others arrested in the “war on terror.”
III. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
DETAIN CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS?
The short answer to this question should be no.  The United
States has a strong legal and judicial system, a system that is
well capable of protecting the state’s interest in safety from ter-
rorism while safeguarding the rights of the detained.101 Justice
Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Hamdi argued that the A.U.M.F.
did not authorize enemy-combatant detention, and it further
cited several statutes that federal prosecutors could use against
citizen terrorists and suspected terrorists instead of detaining
them as enemy combatants.102 Some accused terrorists cap-
tured by the United States or allied governments have been
successfully prosecuted in Article III courts.  These courts have
capably balanced the sensitivity of the defendant’s potentially
dangerous knowledge and presentation of continuing danger
with their constitutionally guaranteed rights to a fair and
speedy trial and representation by counsel.
The secretive standards for detaining United States citizens
as enemy combatants, on the other hand, are filled with pitfalls
and dangers to both public safety and civil liberties.  Some of
the problems with secretive enemy-combatant detention come
from denying citizens the civil liberties that we have come to
expect in this country.  Yet there is the additional public-rela-
tions problem, both within the United States and outside of its
borders.  Even if the government does its utmost to preserve
and protect the civil liberties of detainees—and does in fact
only detain citizens as enemy combatants when it has impec-
cable proof—the fear that the system is not so pure, and the
government’s reluctance thus far to disprove that fear, com-
pounds this public-relations nightmare and leads some to
believe that the government is overstepping its constitutionally
granted power and violating citizens’ civil liberties.
IV. THE MATTER OF THE
MODEL
One reason the government
should detail its process and
method used to determine the
enemy-combatant status of
citizens is to inform those who
may commit future acts.
Although it seems illogical,
terrorists and potential terror-
ists should know the stan-
dards they will be judged by
so they can consider both
those standards and that judg-
ment before they plan and act.
Open standards and disinterested arbiters of those standards
are part of our rule-of-law tradition; this may well be the “free-
dom” we fight for in the “war on terror.”
Of course, some might argue that muddled, confusing, and
shifting standards provide a better deterrent against a shadowy
enemy.  Perhaps not knowing what they will be arrested for
and how they will be treated is more of a deterrent than 
definitive knowledge that grave actions will carry grave conse-
quences.  Yet even if effective, that tactic pulls our government
away from its historical tradition of the rule of law.  If the gov-
ernment keeps its citizen-detention standards a mystery, it will
exchange our inherent moral compass for a tactic that has not
been proven effective.  As a tactic, mysterious standards may
be effective in the short run, but in the long run, they are self-
defeating.  Shrouding the substantive standards used by the
government in mystery may cause us to lose a chance at deter-
rence and may harm the global view of the United States.  
Dean Peter Raven-Hansen has made the important point
that “‘you can look it up’ is an Americanism central to the rule
of law and lawmaking.  Yet, while a non-citizen could look up
the November 13 Order in the Federal Register,103 United
States citizens Hamdi and Padilla, ironically, could not look up
the law governing their detention before the Hamdi deci-
sion.”104
Sunlight cast on these standards would not really be for the
sake of those individual terrorists and potential terrorists (who
are not likely to be deterred by reading published standards),
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but should be published for the sake of fledgling and develop-
ing democracies, who model their actions and laws after those
of the United States.  The rule of law and the Constitution are
examples to be dispersed across the world.  The Court wrote in
Milligan of the power of punishment through the law “no mat-
ter how great an offender the individual may be, or how much
his crimes may have shocked the sense of justice of the coun-
try, or endangered its safety.  By the protection of the law
human rights are secured; withdraw that protection, and they
are at the mercy of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited
people.”105
More than a century later, Ronald Reagan and others spoke
of America as a “shining city upon a hill” that is “still a beacon,
still a magnet for all who must have freedom, for all the pil-
grims from all the lost places who are hurtling through the
darkness, toward home.”106 Even if no law requires the gov-
ernment to publish these standards, the United States—the
“shining city upon a hill”—has a moral imperative to share its
standards.  
Sharing standards also means sharing America’s values.  No
country stands before the United Nations to argue for the right
to declare political dissidents to be enemy combatants based
on little proof of wrongdoing simply because the governments
of Syria, Iran, or North Korea do so.  Yet, if they can make that
argument using a United States example, the cause of liberty
worldwide is damaged.  Additionally, emerging democracies
often base their constitution and governmental system at least
in part on that of the United States.  A clear, open model can
shape the detention standards of frail emerging democracies
like those in Afghanistan and Iraq.  While we can be fairly con-
fident that our executive branch is careful to balance national
security with civil liberties, it is all too easy in developing
countries for leaders to deal with dissent via the proverbial
“knock on the door in the night,” and then to detain citizens
based on scant evidence for which the writ of habeas corpus,
the most important of rights, is so necessary to protect
against.107
Thus there are two reasons for the United States to release
the standards it uses to detain citizens as enemy combatants.
The first is the importance to our nation and the world of
morally clear rule-of-law decisions.  The second reason is for
democracies around the world who look to the United States
as a model and pattern their actions after ours.  In being open
and honest about the standards it uses to detain its own citi-
zens, the United States can address and ensure the strength of
its own democracy and that of dozens of democracies develop-
ing across the globe.
In the century before last, the Court wrote that “it is very
evident that the common laws of war—those maxims of
humanity, moderation, and honor—ought to be observed by
both parties in every civil war. Should the sovereign conceive
he has a right to hang up his prisoners as rebels, the opposite
party will make reprisals.”108 If the United States upholds
strict standards, it has the moral force to hold other nations to
the same strict standards.  If the government were more open
about the standards and factors it uses to determine when it
has the unilateral right to whisk a citizen away to a military
brig, world leaders who detain their citizens could not use our
secrecy to justify their own.  Whatever the standards are for
detaining American citizens as enemy combatants, the United
States should publish and clarify those standards so both its
own citizens, and those of the rest of the world, will know the
standards by which they are judged.
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RESOURCES ON 
PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE
Center for Court Innovation
www.problemsolvingjustice.org
National Center for State Courts
www.ncsconline.org/PSC
Two excellent web-based resources
now exist for judges to explore the con-
cepts behind a problem-solving
approach to justice.  New York’s Center
for Court Innovation has set up a web-
site, and the National Center for State
Courts established one last year.
Both of the websites attempt to go
beyond application of these concepts in
specialized courtrooms and dockets,
like drug courts or mental-health
courts.  The concepts involved in prob-
lem-solving justice—such as informed
decision-making, judicial monitoring,
community engagement, a focus on
results—can be applied in many con-
texts. 
The Center for Court Innovation’s
site includes an overview of the princi-
ples of problem-solving justice, a set of
fact sheets and self-assessment tools,
and several monographs exploring the
concepts in detail.  Another feature that
will be helpful to many is an easy-to-
access set of sample documents from
courts around the country.  You can look
at (and perhaps adapt to your own
court) a record used for recording com-
munity service work in a South Carolina
pretrial intervention program, a com-
munity-court-volunteer application
from San Diego, a training curriculum
used for police officers by a community
court in Atlanta, or a community survey
used by a court in Virginia.
The National Center for State Courts
has its online Problem-Solving Justice
Toolkit.  The toolkit is interactive, so
that you can easily move to the resources
of most interest to you.  It includes
explanatory text, hundreds of links to
online resources, and videoclips from 22
judges, attorneys, social workers, and
court managers discussing topics related
to problem-solving justice.
To use the toolkit, go to the section
marked “Initial Assessment Questions.”
Based on what you are most interested in
(such as resources available to address
problems you’ve been seeing), you’ll be
taken to the resources in that area.
THE POLLING REPORT
www.pollingreport.com
Political junkies and students of pub-
lic opinion will find this website—and
its twice-monthly newsletter—of great
interest.  It is the primary source of pub-
lic-opinion information found on the
Court Review Resource Page.
On the public side of its website, you
can always find the latest surveys on
approval of the United States Supreme
Court.  You’ll also find a section of the
website providing survey responses on
the law and civil rights.  
In addition, of course, you’ll find
polls and analysis regarding the cam-
paign for President and campaigns in
every state for the Senate, for Congress,
or for Governor.
Subscribers ($195 per year) receive
the newsletter, which provides analysis
of trends in public opinion.  Though it is
focused primarily on political trends,
there is also broader discussion of opin-
ion and the issues that shape it.  Articles
go behind the raw numbers and discuss
the ways in which politicians in both
parties try to shape their messages to tap
into current views of the voters.
Subscribers also receive access to a por-
tion of the website that has daily updates
of opinion polls in every state.  Those
who have a strong interest in the presi-
dential election and the potential results
in key states will find those polls of sub-
stantial interest as November
approaches.
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